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GO WORLD

WINTER 1988-89 NO.54



THE ISHI PRESS

The 2nd World Go Championship The Fujitsu Cup

Qualifying tournaments have already started around the world for this year's Fujitsu Cup, the main section of which gets under way in February. The addition of representatives from South America and Chinese Taipei makes the Second Fujitsu Cup more international in scope than ever. In sponsoring this tournament, Fujitsu's aim is to contribute to the popularization of go and to strengthen the bonds of friendship among the people of the world.

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第二回 世界囲碁選手権 富士通杯

1989 Tournament
schedule/venue
Round 1,
Saturday, April 1: Tokyo,
Round 2,
Monday, April 3: Tokyo,
Round 3,
Saturday, June 3: Tokyo,
Semifinals,
Saturday, July 1: Osaka.
Playoff for 3rd place,
Saturday, August 5: Tokyo,
Final,
Saturday, August 5: Tokyo.

Participants: 24 players.
Seeded players: 3
China: 5
Korea: 4
Chinese Taipei: 2
U.S.A.: 1
Europe: 1
South America: 1
Japan: 7

FUJITSU

CONTENTS

Go World News	2
The 1st World Go Championship: The Fujitsu Cup	7
Final: Takemiya v. Rin	8
Go: The Immortal Game	13
Fighting for \$400,000: The Ing Cup	18
Round 2: Cho Hun-hyun v. Kobayashi Koichi	19
Ishida Yoshio Wins the IBM Haya-go Open Tournament	25
36 Tesuji Patterns	28
Capturing Race Problems	28
36 Life and Death Patterns	29
43rd Honinbo Title (Takemiya v. Otake)	37
Game One	38
Game Two	43
Game Three	45
Game Four	49
Game Five	53
Game Six	57
Game Seven	60

The cover: An intro or seal case depicting the Taoist legend of two go-playing immortals inside an orange. From the collection of Narita Jun'ichi.

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Go World News



Cho Hun-hyun (left) makes a good start by defeating Rin Kaiho in the first game of the Ing Cup semifinal. Watching is Yoon Ki-hyun 9-dan of Korea.

International Tournaments

Ing Cup

In the semifinals of the 1st Ing Cup, held in Seoul on 20 and 22 November 1988, Nie Weiping of China defeated Fujisawa Shuko of Japan and Cho Hun-hyun of Korea defeated Rin Kaiho of Taiwan, both by a 2-0 margin. The final will be held in April 1989. For a full report, see page 18.

Japan Finally Wins a Super Go Series

In their fourth attempt, the Japanese team has finally managed to win a Japan-China Super Go series and in the process chip away a little at the legend of Nie Weiping's invincibility. The triumph when it came was a decisive one, being a 7-2 win. The hero for the Japanese side was an unlikely one, Hane Yasumasa 9-dan of Nagoya, a player who though much respected by fellow professionals has not yet won an open title.

The 4th Super Go Series started out differently from the previous series when the first batter for the Japanese team, Yoda Norimoto 7-dan, almost cleaned up the opposition single-handed. Yoda defeated in succession Yu Bin 7-

dan, Chen Xinlin 7-dan, Wang Qun 8-dan, Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan, Jiang Jiuzhiu 9-dan, and Ma Xiaochun 9-dan, thus giving his team what would normally be an almost unbeatable lead of 6-0. However, in the eyes of many go fans this only made the series fifty-fifty, as the Chinese still had Nie, who was so far unbeaten in the Super Go; Nie had strung together nine wins in a row to win three series for China. When Nie stopped Yoda's winning run, then continued by beating Awaji Shuzo 9-dan, it looked as if history might repeat itself, but in their game on 18 December Hane finally toppled the giant. Hane took advantage of a misreading by Nie to win by 2 1/2 points.

To date Hane's major achievement has been winning the 9-dan section of the Kisei twice (in 1985 and 1986) and playing in three Meijin and two Honinbo leagues (including the current one). One hopes that this success, which has made him a hero in the Japanese go press, will be the springboard for further achievements in tournament go. Hane (born in June 1944) is a specialist in the high Chinese-style fuseki, with which he has a good winning percentage, and he is perhaps the only high-ranking professional to use a personal computer in his go study.



Hane 9-dan

Kobayashi Koichi Wins Japan-China Meijin Title

There is yet another new international match in the Far East. Following on the Japan-China Tengen match, inaugurated in June last year, we now have an annual best-of-three match between the Japanese and Chinese Meijins. The first match, held in December 1988, was a triumph for the Japanese Meijin, Kobayashi Koichi, who beat his Chinese counterpart, Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan, 2-0. Kobayashi Meijin forced his opponent to resign in both games (played on 11 and 13 December). Liu Meijin (actually 'Mingren' in Chinese) was unable to improve on his performance in the Japan-China Tengen match, which he lost 0-2 to Cho Chikun (see GW52, page 4 for a report).

Japanese Tournaments

Kobayashi Takes Meijin Title from Kato

As readers will have guessed from the preceding report, Kobayashi's challenge to Kato Masao met with success. In fact, after taking the first game Kato was not able to pick up another win, so Kobayashi took the title 4-1. That made him Kisei-Meijin for the second time.

The series had two turning points: first, a bad mistake by Kato in a capturing race in the second game which could be called the culprit for his losing the series; second, a brilliant move by Kobayashi in the third game which conjured up a ko for a seemingly dead group of stones. Winning

this game seemed to give Kobayashi unstoppable momentum.



Kobayashi Meijin defeats Liu Mingren two straight. Watching is Takemiya Honinbo.

Complete results:

Game 1 (7, 8 Sept.). Kato (B) won by resig.
 Game 2 (20, 21 Sept.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.
 Game 3 (28, 29 Sept.). Kobayashi (W) by 2 1/2 points.
 Game 4 (12, 13 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.
 Game 5 (19, 20 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.

As noted in our previous issue, Kato's readoption of his old favourite, the sanren-sei (three star-point stones in a row) fuseki pattern, aroused interest. He kept it up, playing it with white in the 4th game and with black in the 5th, so it was featured in four of the five games. In a commentary on the 3rd game in *Kido*, Takemiya, who considers himself the patent-holder of this pattern, had some critical comments to make about Kato's sanren-sei and warned him not to use it against him in the Oza title match. For the sequel, see the next item.

Kato Defends the Oza Title

The one bright spot for Kato last year was defending the Oza title against Takemiya. Kato had already lost three title matches (all to Kobayashi: the Kisei 1-4, the Gosei 0-3, and the Meijin 1-4), so he badly needed a win to salvage

something from the wreckage. He got his win, but luck had something to do with it.

Takemiya went into the title match at the top of his form and looking to have very good chances to take the title from a lacklustre Kato, but all his plans were upset when he forfeited the first game for an infringement of the rules. Takemiya had played well and had a certain half-point win when, in byo-yomi, he retook a ko without making a ko threat. The endgame was virtually over and the players were fighting a half-point ko, but apparently Takemiya lost track of what had happened because he was absorbed in counting the score. The shock of throwing away a won game was too much even for the resilient Takemiya and before he could recover the series was over. It may have no connection, but he surprised everyone by playing his second move in the second game on the 3-3 point. When he lost this game by half a point, it was apparent that he had been completely deserted by Lady Luck.

Kato continued with his newly rediscovered fondness for the sanren-sei in this series, playing it in every game, including twice with white. This time his sanren-sei showed its true worth and helped him to prevail against the sanren-sei master himself. He has now won the Oza title for seven years in a row, which matches Sakata's record in the Honinbo, and for nine terms in total, which matches Takagawa's in the Honinbo. If Kato can win this title one more time, he will have a unique place in modern tournament history.

The results:

- Game 1 (27 October). Kato won by forfeit.
- Game 2 (9 November). Kato won by 1/2 point.
- Game 3 (21 November). Kato won by resig.

Cho Chikun Defends the 14th Tengen Title

Not much is heard from Cho Chikun these days, at least compared to the mid-1980's, when he dominated the tournament scene, but he has by no means been put out to pasture. In fact, with two of the top seven titles, Judan and Tengen, he has moved ahead of Kato and is now the third-ranking player, after Kobayashi and Takemiya. At the end of last year Cho secured his position by making his first defence of the Tengen title.

Cho's opponent was Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan, who was making his third challenge for the title. Sonoda, who plays an even more thoroughgoing centre game than Takemiya (whom he beat in the Tengen semifinal), was only able to win one

game in each of his previous appearances in the title match (in 1977 and 1986); this time he did better, scoring half-point wins in two games, but his first title proved just as elusive as ever. This was a disappointment not just for him but also for the Kansai Ki-in, which hasn't been able to take an open title since Hashimoto Shoji won the Oza title in 1981.

The results:

- Game 1 (17 Nov.). Sonoda (B) won by 1/2 point.
- Game 2 (25 Nov.). Cho (B) won by resig.
- Game 3 (2 Dec.). Cho (W) won by resig.
- Game 4 (21 Dec.). Sonoda (W) won by 1/2 point.
- Game 5 (26 Dec.). Cho (W) won by resig.

Takemiya Leads Kobayashi in Kisei

Takemiya has got off to a good start in the 13th Kisei title match, forcing Kobayashi to resign in the first game, which was played in New York on 18, 19 January 1989. Takemiya approached this match brimful of confidence: in the last half year he has been playing some of the best go of his career and, even more important, he has been doing well against Kobayashi, who has beaten him badly in their previous title encounters. The turning point was his convincing win over Kobayashi in the Fujitsu Cup (see GW53); after that he beat him in the Oza playoff, the Tengen quarter-final, and a TV game. With his Kisei win, he now has five wins in a row against Kobayashi, so at present he clearly has the upper hand.

Takemiya is best known for his sanren-sei with black, but actually his niren-sei (two star-point stones in a row) with white is, if anything, held in higher esteem by fellow professionals. In the Kisei playoff against Cho he scored two superb wins with white, his performance in the second game in particular being lavishly praised by Shuko. He followed that up with equally brilliant play with white in the first game of the title match. If things continue this way, Kobayashi might be in trouble.

In GW53 we gave the results in the first and second rounds of the second stage of the Kisei. Further results were as follows:

Semifinals. Takemiya beat Sakata, Cho beat Kato.

Playoff to decide the challenger.

- Game 1 (3 Nov.). Cho (W) won by 2 1/2 points.
- Game 2 (8 Dec.). Takemiya (W) won by resig.
- Game 3 (15 Dec.). Takemiya (W) won by resig.

44th Honinbo League (as of 31 January 1989)

Rank	Player	O	KK	Y	KM	C	KT	H	KS	Score
1	Otake Hideo	—	0		1	1			0	2 — 2
2	Kobayashi Koichi	1	—	0	0				1	2 — 2
3	Yamashiro Hiroshi		1	—		0	1	0		2 — 2
4	Kato Masao	0	1		—		0		0	1 — 3
5	Cho Chikun	0		1		—	1	1		3 — 1
5	Kojima Takaho			0	1	0	—	1		2 — 2
5	Hane Yasumasa			1		0	0	—	1	2 — 2
5	Kataoka Satoshi	1	0		1			0	—	2 — 2

Note: The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

Late news. The second game, played on 1, 2 February, was won by Kobayashi.

Cho Leads 44th Honinbo League

As the Honinbo league enters the midstretch, former title-holder Cho Chikun has the lead, but actually he suffered his first setback in the fourth round, losing to Otake. Before that he had had a lead of two points, which is unusual so early in the league. This year the wins and losses have been distributed pretty evenly, with six players on two wins two losses. At the tail of the field is Kato Masao, who still hasn't come out of his 1988 slump.

14th Meijin League Starts

It's too early to make any predictions, but one might note that Kato is making a bad start here

too. Of the three new players, Kamimura Kunio 8-dan, a Kitani-school contemporary of Ishida Yoshio and the husband of former Japan women's amateur champion Tsutsumi Kayoko, is making his first appearance in a league.

Redmond Beats Takemiya Honinbo

As reported in GW52 (page 12), Michael Redmond made a good start to last year, with good performances against 9-dans, culminating in a win over Hashimoto Shoji in the Judan tournament. Michael did even better in the second half of the year, which he wound up with a win by 1 1/2 points over the current world champion, Takemiya Honinbo, in the main section of the Gosei tournament. This was an impressive result because he played white against Takemiya's san-

14th Meijin League (as of 31 January 1989)

Rank	Player	KM	R	C	F	T	I	H	A	KK	Score
1	Kato Masao	—			0						0 — 1
2	Rin Kaiho		—				1				1 — 0
3	Cho Chikun			—		0	1				1 — 1
4	Fujisawa S.	1			—				0		1 — 1
5	Takemiya			1		—					1 — 0
6	Ishida Yoshio		0	0			—				0 — 2
7	Honda Kuniyisa							—		1	1 — 0
7	Awaji Shuzo				1				—		1 — 0
7	Kamimura K.							0		—	0 — 1

Note: The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

ren-sei and bested him in a middle-game fight.

Apart from this win, Michael also beat Yamabe 9-dan in the Tengen tournament. After Hashimoto Shoji, his next opponent in the losers' section of the Judan tournament was the legendary Sakata; Michael played well with white and had Sakata thinking that he had lost, but in the end Michael fell short by just half a point. His other notable achievement last year was gaining promotion to 6-dan in the Oteai (rating tournament) in October. His overall record for the year was 21-16, a winning percentage of 56.7. More significant was his record against 9-dans of six wins to seven losses.

With all the new international tournaments there is so much pressure on space in the magazine that we failed to keep our promise to present the game with Hashimoto Shoji, but we hope to catch up with a report on Michael's best games of 1988 in our next issue.

New Location for the New York Go Club

Last autumn the New York Go Club moved to new premises at 182 Fifth Avenue, 2nd floor, New York, N.Y. 10010. Hours are 3 to 12 on weekdays and 12 to 12 on the weekend.

2nd Fujitsu Cup Gets Under Way

A greatly expanded 2nd Fujitsu Cup has already got under way, with preliminaries being held in Japan, Europe, and North and South America. The number of players has been increased from 16 to 24, with Chinese Taipei and South America participating for the first time.

The top three place-getters in the 1st Cup will be seeded into the final section of the 2nd Cup. Other places are allocated as follows: Japan 7, China 5, Korea 4, Chinese Taipei 2, U.S.A. 1, South America 1, Europe 1. Another big change this year is that players will represent their countries, not their go associations.

The U.S. representative will be Jimmy Cha 4-dan, who defeated Michael Redmond 6-dan in the final of the qualifying tournament. Third and fourth places were taken by America's other professionals James Kerwin 1-dan and Janice Kim 1-dan.

The European qualifying tournament was won by Ronald Schlemper, amateur 7-dan of Holland. The South American representative will be Fernando Aguilar, amateur 6-dan of Argentina.

WORKSHOPS IN THE PRACTICAL, CREATIVE AND HEALING ARTS

GO WORKSHOP AT HOLLYHOCK



"The focus of the workshop will be on improving your strategic decisions and broadening your whole board vision. Improving your tactics and local fighting will also be taught."


James Kerwin

A five-day workshop, July 17-22, at Hollyhock with James Kerwin, a professional shodan since 1978. Kerwin, a disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru, 9-dan, became the first

Westerner to enter the record books of professional tournament go when he won the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament in 1978. The workshop will be followed by dan-level and kyu-level tournaments.

Hollyhock is located on Cortes Island, 100 miles north of Vancouver, Canada in a beautiful West Coast beach setting. Tuition, plus full room and board \$545 (Canadian Dollars). Spouses and children welcome.

Register by sending a \$100 deposit or write for our free brochure.



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The First World Go Championship: The Fujitsu Cup

Takemiya: The World's Strongest Player



Takemiya: on top of the world after defending the Honinbo title and winning the Fujitsu world championship. His sanren-sei is already said to be the most imitated fuseki strategy, among professionals and amateurs alike. After his latest feat, it can only become more popular.

The first-ever world go championship has ended with the most fitting result — a victory by Takemiya Masaki, who freely acknowledges that he is the strongest player around. Takemiya is unique not only for his centre strategy but also for the innocent exuberance of his boasting. When he blows his own trumpet, no one takes offence because of the cheerful manner in which he does it: Japanese go fans just enjoy the music.

When he gave the following commentary on the Fujitsu final, Takemiya was in a typically cheerful mood, but at the same time he was quite ready to criticize his own play. The result is a lively commentary which gives a lot of insight into the thinking behind his centre strategy. It's particularly interesting to see that even for Takemiya finding the best way to develop the sanren-sei is a matter of trial and error. Even a seemingly straightforward pattern like this conceals unlimited complexity. The reporter interviewing Takemiya for *Kido* was Akiyama Kenji.

Kido: So you finally became the world's num-

Nie	}	Nie	}	Nie	}	Rin
Schlemper						
Kato	}	Kato	}			
Imamura						
Rin	}	Rin	}	Rin		
Suh						
Yu	}	Cho	}			
Cho Chikun						
Tsao	}	Takemiya	}	Takemiya	}	Takemiya
Takemiya						
Ma	}	Ma	}			
Jang						
Shiraishi	}	Shiraishi	}	Kobayashi		
Lim						
Kobayashi	}	Kobayashi	}			
Cho H.H.						

ber one player. What should we call you — Takemiya Honinbo or World Champion, Takemiya?

Takemiya: *Go Weekly* put it an interesting way: the world's strongest man. Let's go with that. (laughter) It feels good. When you think about it, there's no one more fitted to be the world's strongest player. Whether you're from Japan or China makes no difference in go, but I suppose the Japanese fans are relieved I won.

Kido: The Japanese flag hasn't been flying high in the Japan-China Super Go series, so for the first time in quite a while the fans have something to cheer about.

Takemiya: It's hard on us, because the fans only look at the results. Actually in personal encounters with Nie I'm leading with four wins to one loss . . . Well, I'm also relieved at my good result. If I play seriously, I won't lose to anyone. (laughter)

Kido: The Takemiya trumpet has sounded. But you were in danger in your first-round game against Tsao. [Takemiya won by half a point.]

Takemiya: That was in April. I hadn't got into the swing of things yet. In my next games, against Ma Xiaochun and Kobayashi Koichi, I crushed the opponent. The games overlapped with the Honinbo title, so I was fighting fit.

Kido: Your sanren-sei had fantastic power in the Ma game and in this game.

Takemiya: There seem to be a lot of people

imitating me these days, but they all fall short of my sanren-sei.

White: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Black: Takemiya Masaki Honinbo

Played in Tokyo on 3 September 1988.





Figure 1 (1-40)



Dia. 1: insensitive

Figure 1 (1-40). Even for Takemiya the 'cosmic style' is not easy.

Kido: Ignoring White's slide at 8 is the Takemiya style; as also is Black 13. What's the real meaning of these moves?

Takemiya: The idea is to dominate the centre with the pincer at 15. If Black makes the insensitive answer at 1 in *Dia. 1*, White extends to 2 and Black's key stone (the marked stone) loses much of its meaning. If Black had played the ordinary joseki of 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', then Black 1 would be reasonable.


Kido: So the aim of 15 is to make the most of

13. There's a close connection between the top left and the bottom right. Isn't White 20, making a hane when the ladder is unfavourable, a strange move?

Takemiya: This is actually a good move. Usually White would just connect at 22 and Black would pull back at 20, but in the game White makes Black play an extra move here.

Kido: But the extra stone makes Black that much thicker.

Takemiya: Right. I felt grateful when I made the ponnuki at 25. This is where my game is not rigorous enough. In a word, Black 25 is heavy. At the party after the game, Nie said, 'What about playing a move around 'a'?' I was impressed by this suggestion. For example, blocking White's path into the centre with 1 in *Dia. 2* would be interesting. Since he is playing a centre game, Black would not be dissatisfied with the exchange of the marked white stone for Black 1. White will probably play 2, so Black can make things hectic with 3. This would probably have given Black a small lead. Even assuming that later the ladder becomes good for White and he escapes with 'a', the marked black stones are light once White has slid along the side [i.e. they no longer serve to threaten the white group], so Black can just discard them.




Dia. 2: a superior strategy

Kido: What if White uses 2 to defend at 3?

Takemiya: The forcing exchange of Black 'b'-White 'c' would be unbearable for him. Even on territory, Black would be unlikely to lose this way. During the game, I thought that there was something funny about Rin's 24. Doesn't a stone at 32 look better than one at 24? If next Black 25, White could then run along the side at 26. Of course, this would lead to a different game.

Kido: Is Black 27 also the Takemiya style? This move is often seen in your games.

Takemiya: Perhaps even now I should have blocked off the centre with 1 in *Dia. 3*. White would be faced with a very tough decision. If he defended at 2, Black could then play 3.



Dia. 3: more power in the centre

Kido: The centre becomes completely black.

Takemiya: Yet if White plays 2 somewhere around 7, Black's invasion at 2 will be all the more severe. The point of 1 was the vital point in this game.

Kido: White 32 is an ideal point.

Takemiya: That's what I'm trying to say. At the time I thought I could let White jump to 32, as blocking his way in the conventional manner with 35 looked reasonable to me. Capturing with 25 was also the conventional move; Black 27 also can't be bad because it makes Black thick. But when you really think about it, you find the truth is different. It was a strange feeling — I knew that there was something funny, something odd. Finally I realized. Black 35 makes bad balance.


Kido: Bad balance? It looks like the only move.

Takemiya: Black has built thickness in the bottom right. He's also thick at the top. When you have thickness in two areas, compromising with a conventional move like 35 is funny. Black has to start a fight. All the preparations necessary for a fight are complete. He has to start a scrap by attaching at 1 in *Dia. 4*. If White 2, then Black 3 and 5 — any and every ladder is good for Black, so if he just cuts White into two, it's obvious he can handle the fight.

Kido: If White 2 at 5, Black fights in similar fashion with 'a'.


Takemiya: Right. If I'd done this, I think that

White might well have been in a bit of trouble. At any rate, Black 35 is flaccid. It was when White played 36 that it finally dawned on me that something was wrong. Black has no answer that's just right.



Dia. 4: use thickness to attack!

Kido: Black 37 is an unusual move, isn't it? In handicap books and also in your sanren-sei book, the reader is told to attach at 1 in *Dia. 5*.




Dia. 5: the book move loses.

Takemiya: That would probably lose the game at one blow. Black has no continuation after White 4. Even if he plays 'a' or 'b', he can't really hope to make an effective attack on the white group, and the fact that his side position is open to the marked white stone makes this strategy ridiculous. Even worse, the marked black stone (35) he's just played loses its meaning.

Kido: Black 1 in *Dia. 6* (next page) is a move you often play.

Takemiya: I did give it some consideration. If White 2, the idea would be to play 3 and 5. Next, I suppose, Black would attach at 'a' or invade at

'b'. This would give a reasonable game. The differences from the actual game are subtle. In any case, the fact that Black has no answer that is just right when White makes the approach move shows that the stones he has already played make bad balance. Black 37 is above all else a patient move. Making a pincer from the side where one's position is open is funny as far as go logic goes, but I shut my eyes to this and staked the game on the centre. Though the centre here is too small...



Dia. 6: another possibility




Figure 2 (41-69)

Figure 2 (41-69). *Rin's misjudgements give Takemiya the centre.*

Kido: Your play is really leisurely — taking gote with 47. One professional referred to this as 'the inimitable Takemiya slackness'.

Takemiya: 'My 'inimitable slackness', eh? It may well be true. Should I have attacked with 'a'?


But the idea of White's splitting my moyo down the middle by pushing down at 'b' disturbed me.

Kido: White attaches at a strange place with 48.

Takemiya: On the contrary, this shows exquisite timing. I had a premonition that White would play here. He hoped to eliminate the weakness at 'a' during the confusion of the fighting.

Kido: You used half your time thinking about 49.

Takemiya: I thought for so long that apparently it made Rin have second thoughts about his plans. If White just uses 50 to pull back at 1 in *Dia. 7*, it will be an unpleasant game for Black. He must answer at 2, so White can take sente with 3. The moment I saw 50, I thought there was something fishy about it. The reason is that White is focussing on Black's light stones. After 51 to 55, Black can handle the position whatever happens.




Dia. 7: the best and simplest strategy for White

Kido: What do you mean by 'light stones'?

Takemiya: The three marked stones are forcing moves [i.e. White has answered them on the inside], so Black doesn't mind discarding them. The result here is that White has set out to capture these light stones. Black 57 is the best move. At this point Rin made a mistake. Let me tell you about the incredible stuff that Rin was reading out here. He said that he should have ataried at 1 in *Dia. 8*. If Black 2, he blocks at 3, and the continuation seems pretty well forced.

Kido: Black has to fill in a liberty with 6. I can see that the squeeze up to 12 follows, but what if White captures with 13 and 15?




Dia. 8: Rin's impressive analysis

11: connects; 18: ko; 21: ko

Takemiya: Black has no choice but to atari at 16. White can't play the ko after White 'a', so he plays 17. After the ko threat of 19, Black has a clever throw-in at 22, so White can't win the ko — that's the sequence that Rin read out.

Kido: That's impressive analysis. What did you read out?

Takemiya: I wasn't thinking of anything. (laughter) I wasn't thinking of anything, but if Rin had played this way I would have read it out too. The continuation after Dia. 8 is *Dia. 9*. The throw-in (the marked stone) is a clever move, so at this point Rin gave up reading out this variation, but when you look at it, it's quite difficult. White could defiantly take up a fighting stance with 1 to 5 and stake his fortunes on being able to save this group. If Black attempts to capture him with 8, White increases his liberties with 9 and 11, then hanes at 13, and on the contrary Black is the one who collapses. Even if Black plays 8 at 'a', he can't really expect to capture White.




Dia. 9: what Rin failed to read

4: connects (below 2); 7: connects (marked stone)

Kido: In other words, Black would have been in trouble if White had used 58 to capture at 68?

Takemiya: That's right. Another funny thing that Rin did was to capture at 60. Whatever happens, connecting at 1 in *Dia. 10* is the only move. If White secured this area in good aji with 3 and 5, there'd be no saying who was ahead. The result in the game is terrible. Black pushes down in sente with 61 etc. By trying to capture the light stones here, White has just got himself trampled on.



Dia. 10: the only move

Kido: If White omits 68, Black plays 68, White 'c', Black 'd'. Black 69 is incredible — a shoulder hit on a star-point stone.

Takemiya: This is the only way to play here. All Black has to do is to paint the centre black.




Figure 3 (70-100)


Figure 3 (70-100). Rin's do-or-die attack

Takemiya: Rin was looking forward to 78, but I had already calculated what I needed to win. Up to 83 I just made him a present of the top and took control of the centre — all according to plan.

Kido: But White makes a nasty attack with 86 and 88.

Takemiya: No, this is unreasonable. It's a kind

of do-or-die move. Securing the top with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11* would be more reasonable, but Black blocks off the side with 4 and looks like winning by roughly 15 points on the board. Even someone as hopeless at the yose (endgame) as me wouldn't let this one get away. Actually my endgame is a lot better these days. Instead of calling me Takemiya, they should call me *Yosemiya*.



Dia. 11: the safe move for White, an easy win for Black

Kido: That's a new one. With two world championships, this is a great time to be a go player.

Takemiya: The Takemiya age has finally come. Naturally I had also planned to win the Ing Cup, but for the first time in quite a while I made a gross blunder . . .




Figure 4 (101-165)

Figure 4 (101-165). A worthy world champion

Takemiya: Crawling at 1 is the vital point: it sets up 9 and 11.

Kido: White 16 at 17 would be safer.

Takemiya: White was probably looking for a place to resign. If he defended the corner with 16, Black would defend solidly at A and head for the goal. He would be way ahead.

Kido: Black takes great profit up to 19. The remaining problem is the centre, but in the end you took everything there too.

Takemiya: That's just the way it turned out. If White had played 32 at 49, the game would have been more or less countable, but I suppose White couldn't see the point of this.

Kido: Despite your supposed diffidence [Takemiya has the reputation of lacking drive compared to players like Cho and Kobayashi, in the sense that he will be content with one title], you've become the world's top player, but this won't be enough to satisfy Japanese fans.

Takemiya: I understand. You're telling me to try harder in the internal tournaments. Let's not fuss about details — I'll just win everything this year so that I can be worthy of my title.

Kido: That's the way.

Takemiya: Saying I'll win everything may sound arrogant, but the truth of the matter is I'm quite modest. My heart is pure white. It's the people who talk modestly who are black-hearted. But I'm still weak. Though the other players are even weaker.

(‘Kido’, Nov. 1988. Translated by John Power.)



Rin — one strategic error and it was all over.

Go: The Immortal Game

William Pinckard

In the 1st century of our era the great Chinese historian Pan Ku had this to say about the game of go:

*It has deep significance. The board has to be square, for it signifies the earth, and the right angles signify uprightness. The pieces (of the two sides) are yellow and black: this distinction signifies the Yin and the Yang — scattered in groups all over the board, they represent the heavenly bodies. These significances being manifest, it is up to the players to make the moves. and this is connected with kingship. Following what the rules permit, both opponents are subject to them — this is the rigour of the Tao.*¹

Go is without doubt the world's oldest continually played intellectual board game. There are several theories about its origin. One venerable tradition claims that it was invented by the legendary Emperor Shun around 2250 B.C. in order to provide intellectual exercise for his dim-witted son. A more recent theory sees go as a development of some ancient tool for calculation. The difficulty with this is that the Chinese have been using a base-10 number system since the dawn of recorded history and calculating with the help of counting-rods — thin sticks of wood about 12 to 16 cm long (the abacus was not known in China until the 2nd or 3rd century A.D.). It seems unlikely that such a system would lead to the development of the 19x19 grid which we see on the go board (or the 17x17 grid recently discovered on boards found in some provincial tombs).

More plausible, I think, is the theory that go developed out of an ancient system of divination in which pieces or counters of two colors were thrown onto a flat board and conclusions drawn from their positions in relation to the directions and to certain 'astral houses' around the celestial equator.² Even today, in tradition-bound Japan, eight key points around the board are called 'stars' (*hoshi*), and the center point is called 'the axis of heaven' (*tengen*). The game, in fact, has always been associated in legends and stories with magicians and Taoist immortals (*hsien*)

The first mention of go in literature (if the

lexicographers are correct) occurs in the Analects of Confucius. There he is quoted as saying, 'It would at least be better to be a gambler or a go-player than not to use the mind at all and do nothing all day but eat and drink.'³ Not very complimentary! But go was not much favored by respectable Confucians. It was, rather, the Buddhists and Taoists who were attracted to it. Simple in its basic principles, its mysteries, like the Tao itself, unfold in a series of paradoxes, each of which must be solved before the player can proceed to a higher level of strength. If chess is a game of war between competing monarchs, go is an analog of a process of creation. The game starts with an empty board. Each piece (stone) is of the same rank and value as every other. One by one the stones are played (and once played, never move), shapes are formed and struggle into life, battle is joined, territories shrink or expand, and finally, at the moment when every potential has been actualized, the game is over: the player with the most territory wins. The strange fascination of this game is expressed in a quatrain by the 8th-9th century Chinese poet Po Chu-i:




1. Old gentlemen, probably members of a poetry club, gathered around a go board. Surimono by Gakutei, ca. 1820-23.

*Mountain monks sit playing go.
Over the board is the bamboo's lucent shade.
No one is visible through the glittering leaves.
But now and then is heard the click of a stone.*⁴

Go reached Japan in the 5th or 6th century A.D. as part of the first wave of imported Chinese culture. Popular at first among Buddhist priests, it was later taken up by the aristocrats of the imperial court. There is in existence today, preserved at the Shosoin Imperial Depository in Nara since the year 756, a beautiful board of Chinese manufacture which belonged to the Emperor Shomu.

The popularity of the game with the Kyoto aristocracy is attested to in the *Pillow Book* of Lady Sei Shonagon and in the well-known go-playing scene near the beginning of Lady Murasaki's novel *The Tale of Genji*. Less well-known, perhaps, is a Noh play entitled *Go* and based on certain events which take place in this part of Lady Murasaki's work. It is of interest because it shows how Taoist ideas associated with go were assimilated in Japan and enriched in the Buddhist context. Here are some passages which are chanted as two actors on the stage, representing Prince Genji's unhappy lovers Utsusemi and Nokiba no Ogi, begin a game:



2. A game of go leads to an altercation. From an illustrated Edo-period album.

*When playing go resentments must clear away
and thoughts become like the moon arising at night
. . . They are in the ocean of endless births and
deaths, and the go stones are like the numberless
grains of sand upon the beach. Even though they
struggle, their hearts remain gentle . . . In the game
their hands reveal benevolence. The mantra Aum
reverberates in the sound of the pieces striking the
board. Before our eyes the boundaries of life and
death become visible, the pattern of Nirvana itself.
The white and black of the pieces are the colors of
day and night. The star points are the nine lights of
heaven and the three hundred and sixty intersec-
tions are the numbers of the days of the year . . .*⁵

When the great warrior clans of the Taira and the Minamoto replaced the aristocrats as governors of the country in the 12th century, they encouraged the study of go as a useful preparation for the strategies and tactics of warfare and for the moral virtues it was supposed to inculcate, such as patience, coolness, courage, generosity, and courtesy. An elaborate code of behavior grew up around the civilities of the game, much of which is still to be observed today, at least in Japan, when go masters sit down to play tournament games.

The first Tokugawa shogun, Ieyasu, established a government Bureau of Go in Edo in 1612 and granted a comfortable go stipend to each of the families of the leading players, turning them into professionals. These measures remained in effect until 1868 and promoted a rapid development in go theory and the general level of play to a degree far beyond what had ever been attained in the country of its birth.⁶

During the peaceful and prosperous years of the Tokugawa era, go became popular for the first time among ordinary folk, especially the townsmen of the 'Three Capitals', Edo, Kyoto and Osaka (illustrations 1 and 2). Go clubs were opened, and go boards became standard equipment in the tea-houses and brothels in the cities and in the post-towns along the great highways (illustration 3). In short, go became what it is today: not an intellectual study but an addiction!

*Everyone plays go now . . . People pass their
existence worrying about their moves just like mem-
bers of the Go Bureau. They put their own lives at
risk out of concern for the life of their stones.
Though these addicts are not Buddhist monks, they
make do with one meal a day; and though they are*

not *yamabushi* priests, they sit up all night as if awaiting the sunrise.⁷



3. Portrait of *Wakakusa*, an accomplished young courtesan of the *Yoshiwara* pleasure quarter. Leaf from an album published by *Harunobu* in 1770.

Another vivid picture is drawn in a terse satirical verse (*senryu*) of the time:

'Just one game,'
they said, and started to play.
That was yesterday.⁸

The board on which the game is played in Japan is a rectangular block of wood measuring (ideally) 45.5 x 42.4 cm. Boards of the best quality are made of the wood of the *kaya* tree (*Torreya nucifera*) and are about 20 to 24 cm in thickness. Boards are chosen as much for sound as for appearance, and a properly aged board of this wood, of the appropriate thickness, gives a very pleasing note of solidity and authority when a stone is placed down on its surface. Since *kaya* trees of the proper quality grow only in a small area of Japan — in Hyuga in the province of Miyazaki — and since the tree must be between 500 and 800 years old when it is cut, such boards have become very scarce and can cost as much as \$50,000 or more (but the average go player in Japan will content himself with a board of pine

costing about \$10 and will probably use pieces made of plastic or glass). In the Edo (1600–1868) and early Meiji (1868–1912) periods, the sides of the board were often lacquered and inlaid with mother-of-pearl or embellished with flakes of gold and silver, but nowadays the board is only oiled to bring out the grain and rubbed until it seems to glow with a warm, soft light of its own. It sits on four short legs carved in the shape of the bud of the Cape jasmine flower (illustrations 3 and 4). The reason for this depends on a visual pun as elegant as it is simple. The word for Cape jasmine is *kuchinashi*, which is a homonym of a phrase meaning 'no talking' — a gentle reminder of propriety to those who might be watching a game in progress! In preparing boards, the lines of the 19 x 19 grid are drawn, even today, in the traditional way by dipping the sharp edge of a naked sword into black lacquer and marking the surface with a succession of quick and supremely self-confident movements.



4. Both in prints and in the theater this scene is popularly known as 'Go-Board Tadanobu'. Woodblock print by *Kuniyoshi*, ca. 1830–33.

The pieces used are called 'stones' (*ishi*) because they are made of polished slate and clam-shell. They are round, double-convex in cross-section, and are deliberately made a little too large, with the result that a row of stones resting



5. A fan print by Toyokuni, published ca. 1810, showing the famous kabuki actor Matsumoto Koshiro V playing go.

on adjacent intersections will always present a slightly irregular appearance — something more of the nature of an ink painting of a plum-tree branch as compared with a marble pillar in a Canaletto painting. The 160 white and 161 black stones in a set are kept in bowls turned from mulberry, zelkova, maple or cherry wood, other kinds of wood being considered damaging to the stones. Thus all the materials which go into making a set are simple and natural, though selected and prepared with the utmost care.

By the 18th century, go was a familiar part of the daily life of the middle classes in Japan. As a natural result, it entered more and more into the arts of the time, especially woodblock prints, for which there was an ever-growing demand.

Portraits of kabuki actors were an important subject for such prints, and several kabuki plays had scenes in which a go board was an on-stage prop. (See the covers of GW16, 21, and 43.) The longest running of such plays was one in which one of the characters was Sato Tadanobu, a loyal retainer of the ill-fated hero Minamoto Yoshitsune. Tadanobu died in 1185, betrayed to his enemies by his treacherous mistress. Generation after generation of artists depicted the dramatic climax of the play, where Tadanobu defies his

enemies and lifts a heavy go board over his head as if to fling it across the stage. (Besides illustration 4 here, see the covers of GW13, 46, and 49.)

In metalwork we sometimes see tsuba or sword-guards with the design known as *kinkishoga*, the so-called 'Four Accomplishments of a Gentleman,' derived from the Chinese cultural tradition. The four are calligraphy, painting, lute-playing — and go (this theme is treated on the covers of GW19 and 48). In album and screen painting there are two standard subjects in which go plays a part. One, as might be expected, given the perennial popularity of the novel, is the go-playing scene in *The Tale of Genji*. This subject was reserved to artists of the native Tosa school. The other, in the repertoire of the Sino-Japanese Kano school of sumi (ink) painters, depicts Chinese sages on a mountain-top, two of them playing while others watch.

It will be noted that in such paintings and prints the artist rarely troubled to draw the correct number of lines on the board. This has puzzled me for years, because Japanese artists always prided themselves on accuracy of detail. In the case of prints the answer may be that so many lines engraved in the small area showing the go board's surface would quickly get clogged with ink during the printing and so destroy the



6. A very unusual sword-guard, made around the beginning of the 18th century by Mogarashi Soten, depicting the story of Sato Tadanobu.

tonal balance desired. But when it comes to paintings, I can only suppose that artists were content just to suggest the board's appearance, thereby saving themselves a lot of tedious brush-work!

The shape of a thick go board lends itself nicely to being copied for small boxes, water-droppers and various okimono (ornaments) made of other materials, and the severely simple shapes and subdued colors of the equipment have made it attractive to fabric designers (see the covers of GW14 and 36 for examples).

In lacquerware I have seen only one design making effective use of the go motif, but what an achievement it was! The object was a three-tier inro (seal case) with the board shown in brown lacquer at the top and the stones spilling down in confusion on the sides — probably an allusion to the Sato Tadanobu theme. The black stones were represented by oxidized silver and the white stones by mother-of-pearl. These were inlaid so as to stand about 1 mm above the ground and were gently convex, just as real go stones should be. It is rather curious, in view of the wonderful decorative possibilities inherent in the go motif, that inro of this quality and originality are not seen more often. Unfortunately, it was stolen from its owner several years ago and never

recovered, so it cannot be illustrated here.

Finally — netsuke. One of the most charming of all go subjects offers one of the most difficult challenges to the netsuke-carver's technical abilities. This is the orange (chiselled in wood or ivory) which conceals the figures of two sages playing go. This is an illustration of a very peculiar Taoist legend. There was a man who had an orange tree in his garden on which grew two unusually large oranges which never decayed. Curious, he cut down the tree and opened the fruit. Out stepped two immortals who immediately sat down and began to play go. After a while one of them passed around a dragon-shaped root from which all three ate. Then he asked for some water, took some in his mouth and spat it onto the ground. From the water arose a dragon which carried them all up to heaven on its back.¹⁰

What a strange story! But how natural it seems to us that immortals should love this game above all others.

Notes

1. Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilization in China, Vol. IV:1, Cambridge, 1962, pp. 322-3.*

2. See the discussion in Needham, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-334, *passim*.

3. *Analects*, Book XVII, Chap. XXII (Legge's

translation).

4. My translation.

5. Hayashi, Yutaka. *Igo Hyakka Jiten*, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 561-2. My translation.

6. It is tantalizing to think that if Louis XV had done the same for Philidor and the other leading masters of the day, France might now be supreme in world chess.

7. Yamaoka, Genrin. *Takaragura*, Edo, 1671 (republished in Tokyo in 1932), p. 52. My translation. A yamabushi is an itinerant Buddhist priest devoted to ascetic practices.

8. See my article on *senryu* in GW15.

9. There are exceptions. The go board on the cover of GW51 is 19 x 19, while the one on the cover of GW30 is about 25 lines across.

10. See Joly, Henri L. *Legend in Japanese Art*, London, 1908, pp. 175-6. Reprinted by Tuttle, 1967 and subsequently. Joly's account, which is based on a late 17th century Japanese work and another, undated, seems very garbled. The orange (*daidai*) is an emblem of long life because the word is a homonym of another word meaning 'generation after generation,' but the story is originally Chinese and seems to allude to Taoist alchemical practices.

Illustrations 1 to 5 are from the collection of the author. Illustration 6 is from the collection of Tanaka Fumio.

Fighting for \$400,000: The Ing Cup

Nie and Cho Hun-hyun to battle it out for the richest prize in history

1st Ing Cup Semifinals

Semifinal 1. Nie Weiping (China) beat Fujisawa Shuko (Japan) 2-0.

Semifinal 2. Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) beat Rin Kaiho (Taiwan) 2-0.

The honour and glory of being the first world professional go champion, not to mention the richest prize in go history, will go to the winner of a best-of-five final, scheduled for April, between Nie Weiping of China and Cho Hun-hyun of Korea. In the best-of-three semifinals, played in Seoul on 20 and 22 November 1988, Nie and Cho both defeated their opponents with straight wins. Since the Ing Cup will only be held once every four years, the winner of the final could be considered as something like the Olympic champion of go.

For various reasons there was great pressure on the four players who gathered in Seoul at the newly completed luxury hotel Lotte World in Seoul: Rin because this was a Taiwanese-sponsored tournament; Cho because the venue was his home town and his performance was subjected to massive media coverage; Nie Weiping because he was a national hero whose fans had come to expect him to win all his important games; and lastly the old lion Shuko because he might not get another such chance for a glorious

finale to his great career.

The results in the Rin-Cho match pretty much reflected the flow of play: Cho played just as aggressively whether taking white or black (he's fond of saying that he doesn't know how to win with the komi) and he outfought and outread Rin, though the latter did have some chances in the second game.


The other semifinal was a different story. It should have been a triumph for Shuko, for he outplayed Nie in both games, showing, especially in the second game, flashes of his old brilliance. However, twice in a row, to the despair of Japanese go fans, he blundered away his lead in the endgame. He lost both games by the cruel margin of half a point.

Of the two, Shuko's loss of the first game was the more regrettable, as up to the final stages the game had been developing as a masterpiece for him. In the pressroom, Go Seigen had already pronounced the game a win for him when Shuko made his blunder, shown in the diagram on the next page. After White 1, connecting at 3 is a mistake that loses a point. White should first exchange 'a' for Black 'b', then connect at 3; Black would then play 'c', but later he would have to add another stone here, thus losing a point compared to what happened in the game.


Even then the game was not lost: the final losing move was White 7, which should have been at 8, forcing Black 'd'. These two slips are fairly elementary for a top professional; the only



The start of the semifinal between Fujisawa Shuko (left) and Nie Weiping. Shuko was not as hale and robust as in his prime, but he had long been looking forward to his showdown with Nie



Game One



Game Two

explanation is that Shuko's stamina must have given out.

Shuko's superb play in the second game shows that he had put his loss in the first game behind him. The highlight of the game is shown in the diagram. The contact play of 1 is an idea that would only occur to Shuko: it doesn't look

stylish but actually it's a very effective move and at one blow carves out a lead for Black. Nie, whom it took completely by surprise, called it a magnificent move. White has no good answer: if White 2 at 9, Black 2 works well; if instead White 2 at 3, the fight after Black counters with 2 will be hopeless for White. Though he won the match,

Nie was full of praise for Shuko's play; he must have felt that he had earned his berth in the finals the hard way.

To show how Shuko played and why he lost, we will present the semifinal games, with a commentary by Nie, in our next issue. In the meantime, we would like to present what was perhaps Cho Hun-hyun's most important win in the tournament.

Cho Hun-hyun v. Kobayashi Koichi (Round 2)

The reason why this game was so important for Cho was that he greatly disappointed his Korean fans by losing to Kobayashi in the first round of the 1st Fujitsu Cup. Korean fans tend to be fanatical: they are overjoyed when you win but merciless when you let them down. Cho relates that after his Fujitsu loss, he felt that there was no place for him to hide when he went home. Whatever happened, he had to take his revenge on Kobayashi. The commentary takes the form of an interview with Kobayashi conducted by the *Let's Go* reporter Kōbōri Keiji.

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Cho Hun-hyun

Komi: 7 1/2; **time:** 3 hours each.

Played in Beijing on 23 August 1988.




Figure 1 (1-53)


Figure 1 (1-53). A good start for Black — spoiled by a dubious hane

Kobayashi Koichi: In this game I built up a sure win for White but let it slip away because of


repeated mistakes in the endgame. I'm deeply ashamed. But even so, Hun-hyun is incredibly tenacious. I would never have imagined it from his straightforward personality when he was a child. [Cho Hun-hyun studied in Japan from 1963 to 1972.]

Let's Go: After all, he's not the perennial number one in Korea for nothing. The really top class players all have a formidable all-round strength. Isn't the fuseki a little odd — White 8, for example?

KK: No, this is a common pattern. If next Black 1 in *Dia. 1*, White will press at 2. When that happens, it's better for White to have played the high move (the marked stone) rather than 'a'. At first, the low pincer of 'a' was the only move played, but then the high move was invented.



Dia. 1: just right for White




Dia. 2: a superior strategy for 12

LG: White 8 makes miai of the pressing move and the pincer at 10. Letting White press is painful, so Black plays 9. Black 11 is an interesting move. He doesn't escape directly with something like a two-space jump.

KK: Black 9 makes the bottom right Black's sphere of influence. The bottom left is White's domain. So instead of a frontal clash, he throws in a twist and plays lightly. Black 11 looks like a good strategy.

White 1 in *Dia. 2* might have been better than 12. Also, once Black had wedged in at 13, instead of playing 22 White should take sente with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, then switch to 5. When Black gets to play 25 and 27, he has won the first round. [Cho commented that he had expected *Dia. 3*; he thought that even with the large komi the result to 27 was good for Black.]




Dia. 3: better for 22

LG: Did you play peacefully with 22 and 24 because of the komi?


KK: I was too conscious of the komi.

LG: Next you sought to live in the corner with 28. So often good players seem to base their strategy on destroying each other's territory rather than making territory of their own. Is White 30 correct shape? Likewise the 32-34 combination? It's the first time I've seen it.

KK: This is pretty much the right way to play here. If White follows *Dia. 4*, he ends in gote. In the game he gets sente to switch to 36.



Dia. 4: crude style



Dia. 5: tenuki is out


LG: Is defending with 35 necessary?

KK: Well, it's natural. If omitted, White can play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*. Playing 2 at 'a', permitting White 2, is unthinkable.


LG: Instead of 30, a player like me would play 1 in *Dia. 6*, attacking the two stones...

KK: I know how you feel, but White doesn't get an attack. Because Black can push along twice in sente with Black 'a' through White 'd'.

LG: Oh, really? So, though the stones look weak, they really constitute quite a strong wall... After White's second approach move at 38, it gets difficult. I suppose Black would be happy to see White invade the corner as in *Dia. 7*.




Dia. 6: not an attack




Dia. 7: Black is happy

KK: Hun-hyun seems to have made a miscalculation in the fight here. The hane of 45 was dubious. If Black had pulled back at 1 in *Dia. 8*, White would have had a hard time of it. Even if White cuts with 2 and 4, Black defends at 5, and the white group here is weak. If White 2 at 'a', he will come under attack after Black 2.

LG: Remembering that Black 'b' below is sente. In the game White has no trouble poking his head out with 48 on. I see what you mean — there's no feeling that White's under pressure.



Dia. 8: good for Black



Dia. 9: possible for 53

KK: He can look forward to pushing down at 'a' and cutting. The opinion was expressed that Black should have played 53 at 1 in *Dia. 9*. The point is that White 2 and 4 are unreasonable. So White will play 2 at 7 or 'a'.





Figure 2 (54-100)



Dia. 10: conventional

Figure 2 (54-100). An unloseable game

LG: A fierce scrap now follows in the centre.

KK: The standard approach for Black 63 would probably be to follow *Dia. 10*, but presumably Black considered this unsatisfactory.


LG: He has to be more aggressive.

KK: So he extended at 63, but playing 1 and 3 next in *Dia. 11* doesn't work well. After White 4 and 6, Black has weaknesses at 'a' and 'b'. As I'm sure you can see, if White cuts at 'b' he can pick up Black's stone at 5.


LG: Is that why he switches to 65? The fighting now spreads all over the board. How is the overall position?

KK: Missing *Dia. 8* has hurt Black. I thought that I had been let off a little easy, but bit by bit my position got even better, until I had an unloseable game. Up to 43 in the next figure there's no way White can lose.

LG: What's happening in the centre fight? Black 71 looks natural. You then cut across the knight's move with 72.



Dia. 11: Black fails



Dia. 12: not interesting for

KK: Well, I thought that this was a good opportunity. Attaching with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12* would not be appropriate in this game.

LG: But this looks impressive — I'd be tempted to play it.

KK: Black would probably link up to the left side with 2 and 4. If White later attached at 'a', Black might just give up the two stones.


LG: Whereas at this stage Black can't give them up.

KK: With 73 Black follows the proverb: don't cut when the opponent strikes across your knight's move.


LG: What if Black goes against the proverb with 1 in *Dia. 13*?

KK: I can't help feeling that even if Black makes a ponnuki, he gets a heavy, cumbersome group.

LG: I can see that Black does make better shape with 73 to 77.



Dia. 13 Black is heavy



Dia. 14: Sente, but . . .

KK: This attachment at 77 makes miai of extending at Black 78 and playing the hane at 81. White can hardly permit Black 78, so the continuation from 78 is natural. Actually, Black 81 doesn't seem to have been such an effective move.

LG: White 84 and 86 are sente. Even so, Black must have been upset at taking gote with 87. Couldn't he have tried for sente with 1 in *Dia. 14*?

KK: So that he can link up on the side with 3? Even then, White 4 is sente, so I thought I could do OK on territory.

LG: You set out to harass the black group with 88. Then you cut with 96 and 98. If you take a proper look, you realize that White doesn't have a single weak group, whereas Black's groups are in bits and pieces.

KK: You'll agree that White is in the lead?

LG: Yes, that's obvious, even to an average amateur.

KK: I didn't expect to lose this game. Having too good a position is dangerous. You let down your guard emotionally . . .




Figure 3 (101-143)

Figure 3 (101-143). Still ahead

LG: Up to 27 you made Black live small in the top right corner and also harassed and harassed the group below. Then you made a solid extension at 28 and switched to the invasion at 32. Even after Black defends with 43, White still has the aji of attacking at A.

KK: The black group at the top is still weak. White should be able to win without doing anything.

LG: You've got a 7 1/2-point komi.

KK: Yet my play after this couldn't have been worse. It was terrible. Losing like this makes me so disgusted with myself I can't say anything.

LG: Well, could you explain to us how the Kisei went off the rails?



Cho Hun-hyun





Figure 4 (144-185)



Dia. 15: White wins

Figure 4 (144-185). *Throwing the game away*

KK: First, instead of 44 White had to force with A. When I played 46, Cho invaded at 47. This is a death-defying invasion. Usually Black would just play something like 73, so I was astonished.

LG: There doesn't seem to be any hope of living in the corner — because Black has to worry about his large weak group on the outside.

KK: I made the facile assumption that I only had to keep the corner to win. White 52 is bad. White should live by blocking at B: he has to threaten Black's eye space. White 64 is even worse. Even White 1 in *Dia. 15* would threaten the corner. It would force Black to live with 2 to 8. Securing the capture of the corner with White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' would then be good enough.

Connecting at 72 in answer to 71 was naive. White should at least consider pushing through at C and cutting.

LG: In the game, though, you took the corner.

KK: Black gouges out the top with 73 and

White has to take the corner group off the board, so this result is hopeless. Black 85 at the bottom, the last large point, is decisive. Cho had finally upset my lead.




Figure 5 (186-223)

Figure 5 (186-223). *A victory for perseverance*

LG: This was a game marked by overoptimism on your part and perseverance on Cho's. It's a pity you lost, but I hope you will take this setback in your stride and do your best as a representative of Japan and the Orient. The time has come when the Japanese players have to show the fans what they're made of.


Moves after 223 omitted. Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

(*'Let's Go*, December 1988)

Shuko had some interesting comments on this game. Basically he agreed with Kobayashi's analysis. He severely criticized Black 45 in Figure 1 and insisted that Black 49 had to be a bamboo joint below 1; even with 53, Black still had to play there, in his opinion. For the next 100 moves he saw Cho as tiding over crisis after crisis. Shuko expressed his admiration for Cho's reading ability. 'Only Hun-hyun, with his brilliant insight, could play a game like this. An ordinary player would have been crushed without trouble. It's an incredible game. I think it's a fine game, with both players going all out.'

Shuko also referred to Kobayashi's numerous mistakes in the latter part of the game, but his final verdict was: 'To put it in a nutshell, White would have won if he'd played 44 in Figure 4 at A.'

Ishida Yoshio Wins the IBM Haya-go Open Tournament



*Congratulations to the Japanese computer.
(Cartoon by Ayusawa Makoto)*

The second international tournament of 1988 saw a victory for one of the top stars of the 1970's, Ishida Yoshio, who has more or less been in hibernation for the last decade. Every now and then Ishida shows signs of taking a serious interest in tournament go again (reaching the top in his mid-twenties as Meijin-Honinbo seemed to cause him to lose his drive); he certainly still has the talent, as his victory in the IBM final showed.

Ishida's opponent was Takemiya, the only player to take part in all three of the new international tournaments established in 1988. Takemiya was also the only title-holder to play in the IBM and, in view of the great form he enjoyed last year, he was the clear favourite for top honours. However, it is only fitting that the winner of a tournament sponsored by a computer manufacturer should be a player whose nickname is 'the computer'.

White: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Black: Takemiya Masaki Honinbo

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 4 October 1988.

Komi: 5 1/2; time per player: one hour, followed by 30 seconds per move.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-50). A new pattern

The aim of 4 is to deter Black from setting up a sanren-sei; if Black plays 5 on the centre-right star-point, then a white enclosure at 6 should prove effective in negating the influence of the sanren-sei.





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1: the joseki is good for Black

Ishida is the first to diverge from standard fuseki. White 22 is a little out of the ordinary, usually you would expect White to jump to 1 in *Dia. 1*, but after the joseki to 5 Black 6 will be an ideal point.


For his part, Black doesn't make the conventional answer to 22; you would expect either Black 30 or 45, but instead Takemiya decides to start a frontal clash with 23 and 25. Takemiya: 'This was the first time I had played 23 and 25. It seemed the manly thing to do.'

Thus we see a new pattern. The result to 41 seems even.

White 48 and Black 49 were dubious. Ishida: 'White 48 lacked ingenuity. I should have attached at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If Black 2, White gets a nice territory with 3 to 7. If instead of 2 Black pulls back at 3, jumping out with White 'a' looks good.'

Takemiya: 'I see. It's a dirty way of playing but maybe it works well. My 49 was funny. I should have attached at 'a'; if White 'b', Black has 'c'. No matter how White answers 'a', Black seals him in perfectly. I wanted to attach, but I put the

stone down at 49 . . . Even so, the flow of the game looks good for Black. At this point I thought that I had an easy game.'



Dia. 2: better for 48




Figure 2 (51-100)

ko: 71, 74, 77; 79: connects


Figure 2 (51-100). Petty play by Takemiya?

The exchange of 57 for 58 costs Black some points, but the presence of 57 gives him a ko in the corner. Takemiya immediately snapped up the bait, but this was a detour from the main fight. Kobayashi Satoru: 'This is strange. Takemiya's not the type of player who's usually interested in capturing stones like this.'

Takemiya: 'That's right. Trying to capture the corner was funny. Instead of 57, I should have made an approach move at 'a'. Attacking immediately with 59 was not interesting. Black 'a' was the move.'

Black loses a lot from the moves he plays as a ko threat, starting with 65. Apparently Takemiya

hallucinated that if he didn't play this forcing sequence, then White could set up life in the corner by playing White 67. Compared to the ordinary endgame move of 65 at 67, Black loses four points, in effect making the komi 9 1/2.




Dia. 3: Black should give up the ko.

Dia. 3. Black should develop his top position with 1, ceding the ko to White. If White 2, Black swallows up the white stones with 3 and 5, putting him 'way ahead', in Takemiya's words.

Because Black attempted willy-nilly to capture the corner, White got to make successive moves at 78 and 80, giving him the honours in this encounter.

White 84. Kobayashi Satoru: 'Taking up position with a move around 94 would secure the lead for White, I think.' Black begins a fierce counterattack with 85; with 87 and 89, he goes all-out. White counters with a placement at 90, but Black manages to make shape by giving up two stones.



Dia. 4: rejected

Figure 3 (101-150). Black saves the group, but . . .

White launches an attack on the large black group with 14, making Black scramble for eye shape with 19 and 21. Just when Black seems to be coming under heavy pressure, however, he

makes the exquisite cut at 33.

Ishida: 'My original plan was to use 34 to capture at 1 in *Dia. 4*, but letting Black capture two stones with 4 would have been unbearable. So I changed course with 34.'




Figure 3 (101-150)

26: connects

Kobayashi Satoru, O Rissei and others following the game thought that Black had skilfully parried the attack when he linked up with 39. Assuming (wrongly, judging by the result) that White was behind in territory, they predicted that he would stake the game upon a risky invasion at 'a'. However, Ishida contented himself with the shallow reducing move of 40.

Kobayashi: 'I was filled with admiration for 40. Ishida had calculated that this would leave him ahead.' Ishida: 'No, I can't deny that this was slack. I should have gone as far as the shoulder hit of 43. White 40 was the reason the game became close. White also lost a little ground in the endgame after this.'

Opinion was divided — some thought White was winning, others that Black had the edge — as the players quietly began the endgame.

Figure 4 (151-200), Figure 5 (201-270).

Ishida by half a point

In the end, Ishida came out a half point ahead. Though Takemiya narrowed the gap in the second part of the game, it seems that his strategic slip in missing *Dia. 3* was too costly.

Ishida: 'I wasn't able to read out my half-point win, but I had the feeling that I was a shade ahead . . . It was a big half point. I'm happy I won the inaugural tournament. I look forward to win-

ning again next year.'




Figure 4 (151-200)




Figure 5 (201-270)

32: connects (below 30); 67: connects (at 20)


Before the IBM tournament began, Ishida had publicly proclaimed that he was going to win it. His reasoning: 'Players with stamina are the ones who do well at long games. The fast games are won by the players who are really strong.' It was perhaps a little early for someone who had just turned 40 (on 15 August) to be implying that only lack of stamina stopped him from doing better, but still he was as good as his word. Moreover, he scored his win in the best Ishida tradition, edging out his opponent by just half a point. His efforts earned him the three million yen (about \$23,000) first prize.

('Go Weekly', 18 October 1988)

36 Tesuji Patterns


Sakata Eio, Hon. Honinbo

The aim of this series is to help you master the basic tesuji patterns that come up repeatedly in games. If you learn these tesujis, you will soon discover how useful they are in actual play. It's no good studying advanced fuseki theory if you miss simple tesujis when the fighting starts. The starting point for developing a strong game is familiarizing yourself with the basic tesuji patterns and life and death positions.




Pattern 10: Black to play

Black has a very cramped position; if possible, he should never let the opponent hane at the head of two of his stones like this, but if it does happen what is his best continuation?



Pattern 11: Black to play

This pattern comes up in handicap games. Black's corner is insecure because his position is open at the side. He doesn't want to move out into the centre, because that will help White. What is the best and quickest way for him to secure his corner?




Pattern 12: Black to play

This position is a little unusual, but the tesuji involved is a basic one. Black would like to link up to his side group, but the marked white stone seems to be in the way. Can you find a way for Black to get around this obstruction?

Answers on page 30.


Capturing Race Problems

In GW50 we gave eight capturing-race problems. Here are some more to test yourself on. In each case, Black seems to be in trouble — unless he can come up with a clever tesuji to turn the tables on the opponent. Can you help him out?




1. Black to play

1 (8-kyu). Black only has three liberties, so he doesn't have any time to waste. The first move will decide everything.




2. Black to play

2 (8-kyu). Both sides only have three liberties, so Black has to prevent White from increasing his liberties. What is the vital point?




3. Black to play

3 (8-kyu). This time White has one more liberty than Black, so the problem for Black is to increase his liberties by two *in sente*.




4. Black to play

4 (7-kyu). The actual capturing race is on the left edge, but the two marked black stones can play a crucial role — if you can find the tesuji.




7. Black to play

7 (6-kyu). This problem is a step up from the first two problems, as it involves a little more reading. Even so, the tesuji pattern involved is a basic one.




8. Black to play

8 (6-kyu). In you know the right go proverb, winning the race will be easy. If you don't, you'll have to use logic to work out the solution.




5. Black to play

5 (7-kyu). This is a strange-looking shape, but the tesuji involved is an elementary one. Black must not let White get a seki.




6. Black to play

6 (7-kyu). The first move in the answer seems to go against go logic, but it is the key point for reducing the opponent's liberties.



9. Black to play

9 (5-kyu). The fight seems hopeless for Black; the key, obviously, is to find the right way to use the marked stone. The solution is elegant: once you see it, you won't forget it.



10. Black to play

10 (5-kyu). This is a difficult problem to finish off with; disciplined analysis is more important than intuition in solving it, but the effort is worth it, because this kind of fight comes up frequently in actual play.


Answers on page 31.



36 Life and Death Patterns


Kato Masao

In this series Kato Masao surveys some of the basic life and death patterns that every go player needs to know. Studying life and death is one sure way to increase your strength; the more common the pattern, the more important that you master it. Helping you to do that is Kato's aim.




Pattern 10. White to play

There's a popular proverb that gives you the solution to this problem. If you don't know the proverb, then you must apply logic to work the problem out for yourself. The answer involves a combination of two techniques.



Pattern 11. Black to play

Black is faced with a difficult decision: should he attack from the outside or from the inside? If he does the wrong thing, he might just help the opponent.



Pattern 12. Black to play


Once again Black has to choose between an attack from the outside and one from the inside — or perhaps the right combination of the two is the answer. *Answers on page 35.*

36 Tesuji Patterns: Answers


Answer to Problem 10

Dia. 1. When White makes a hane at the head of your two stones, the best answer is to make a counter-hane. Black 1 is a patient move, but since Black has let himself get into a bad position, he has to make the best of it by being patient. Trying to resist White's hane will only make his position worse.


Dia. 2. If White 2 and Black 3, White will connect at 4, which is the vital point. Black then dodges to 5, stabilizing his group.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: reasonable



Dia. 3: the vital point



Dia. 4: bad

Dia. 3. White 4 shows an ignorance of shape. White will be faced with a tough fight after Black cuts at 5.


Dia. 4. Black must not fight back with 1, as this only gives White good moves at 2 and 4. Black must add a stone at 5, so White builds excellent thickness with 6. Black 1 is a point Black should not want to play on.

Answer to Problem 11


Dia. 1. Black 1 is a good, light move, which

safely closes off the corner. Black 'a' instead would be too solid and inefficient. The timorous move of 'b' would feel wretched and in any case would give White follow-up forcing moves.


Dia. 2. Black need not fear an invasion at 1; White is helpless after Black 2. However, you should note that Black will have a little bit of bad aji if White gets a stone at 'a'.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: safe



Dia. 3: greedy



Dia. 4: disagreeable


Dia. 3. A surprisingly large number of people play the 'solid' move of 1, but though this looks like correct shape, actually it is too greedy. White 2 puts Black on the spot.

Dia. 4. Once he's played the marked stone, Black has no choice but to intercept at 1. After White 2, White gets a satisfying peep at 4; when he descends at 6, Black will find that the two white stones have a lot of life left in them. Capturing them is going to take a lot of trouble.


Answer to Problem 12

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a very clever tesuji. This kind of move could easily be a blind spot in an actual game.

Dia. 2. The reason why Black 1 is so clever is that he can set up a snapback if White ataris at 2. That means that White is left with two cutting points after Black 3, so he can't cut Black off from his side group.



Dia. 1: tesuji!




Dia. 2: snapback


Dia. 3. If White 4, then clearly Black is safe after 5. White can't take care of both of his cutting points.

Dia. 4. Intercepting with 1 shows that Black is not even thinking about the problem. The stones are lost after White 2.

(*'Let's Go'*, April 1983.)



Dia. 3: safe



Dia. 4: failure


Capturing Race Problems: Answers

Continued from page 29.


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Wedging in at 1 is the key move for reducing White's liberties.


Dia. 2. The benefit from sacrificing the stone is that it quickly leads White to use up his liberties.




Dia. 1: the tesuji



Dia. 2: an effective sacrifice



Dia. 3: Black wins




Dia. 4: a mistake

Dia. 3. The atari at 1 looks nasty, but White has no follow-up. Black wins the semeai (capturing race) after 4.


Dia. 4. Black 1 is the wrong continuation; now the sacrifice goes to waste, as White wins the fight by wedging in at 4.

Dia. 5. The hane of 1 is too slow; White connects at 2, then wins the fight with 4. Black has the consolation of linking up his corner stones,

but he could have had everything.



Dia. 5: partial failure




Dia. 6: complete failure

Dia. 6. Of course, none of our readers committed the sin of playing atari at 1. This way Black gets nothing.


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the key move: intuition should tell you this. Once you play 1, you can work out the rest of the problem as you go along (though reading it all out first is the ideal).

Dia. 2. White 2 and 4 are the only moves. Now we come to the turning point of the problem.




Dia. 1: the only move




Dia. 2: turning point

Dia. 3. Black now turns at 5, driving White into the side of the board. White can't resist, be-

cause each black move keeps him down to two liberties. This technique is known as a 'loose ladder'.




Dia. 3: Black wins




Dia. 4: Black loses

Dia. 4. Black 5 is a bad mistake; Black's original tesuji goes to waste.

Dia. 5. Black 1 is hopeless: White immediately gets four liberties with 2.



Dia. 5: helping White




Dia. 6: worst

Dia. 6. Black 1 is the worst move: the exchange for 2 nullifies the efficacy of Black 'a'. White may now try to kill Black's corner group. If Black ataris to the right of 2, White plays to the left of 1 and gets a snapback.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the key move. If you get this move right, everything else will fall into place.


Dia. 2. White is forced to defend at 2, so Black is now ahead in the fight.



Dia. 1: the tesuji




Dia. 2: Black wins



Dia. 3: wrong

Dia. 3. White can't fill in a black liberty with 2. After 4 —


Dia. 4. Black captures with 5 and 7. White




Dia. 4: suicide

has fallen into a trap.

Dia. 5. If White attacks from the other side with 2, Black sacrifices a stone at 5.



Dia. 5: sacrifice




Dia. 6: oi-otoshi

Dia. 6. Black now catches White in an *oi-otoshi* — White can't connect.


Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Black must cut at 1, as this is the only weak point in White's position.


Dia. 2. Black then increases the sacrifice to two stones: this is the key to this problem.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: sacrifice



Dia. 3: a squeeze




Dia. 4: throw-in


Dia. 3. The sacrifice gives Black a squeeze.

Dia. 4. Again he sacrifices a stone.

Dia. 5. After 11 Black is ahead in the fight. White's shape after the squeeze resembles a stone tower, so this tesuji is known as the 'stone tower squeeze'. It's a basic technique that every go player has to master.



Dia. 5: success




Dia. 6: failure

Dia. 6. Any move that lets White connect at the vital point of 2 will lose.


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Once again the theme is sacrificing two stones.


Dia. 2. White 2 and 4 are forced. When Black descends at 5, the issue is decided.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: Black wins



Dia. 3: ahead




Dia. 4: wrong


Dia. 3. If White continues, Black has no trouble winning the fight.

Dia. 4. Giving White a chance to capture at 2 is a mistake.

Dia. 5. White's throw-in at 4 changes the picture.



Dia. 5: White's counter




Dia. 6: a seki


Dia. 6. White now gets a seki, which is a big setback for Black.

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. At first glance this fight may seem hopeless for Black, as he only has three liberties, but White's core three stones also only have three. However, Black cannot attack them directly. Starting with the hane of 1 is the only move.




Dia. 1: a surprising start




Dia. 2: Black wins

Dia. 2. The point is that White can't block at 2. If he does, Black ataris with 3 and 5 and White can't connect.



Dia. 3: shortage of liberties




Dia. 4: Black wins


Dia. 3. White will therefore connect at 2, whereupon Black makes another hane at 3. The idea once again is to exploit White's shortage of liberties.

Dia. 4. White can't connect after Black 7: he is caught in an oi-otoshi.

Dia. 5. Black 1 looks like a tesuji, but it doesn't work when he has so few liberties. White just connects at 2.



Dia. 5: the wrong tesuji




Dia. 6: White wins

Dia. 6. White is one move ahead in the fight.


Answer to Problem 7

Dia. 1. Black must start by filling in a liberty, so the hane at 1 is the only move.


Dia. 2. He continues by making the familiar two-stone sacrifice.




Dia. 1: the only move



Dia. 2: sacrifice



Dia. 3: Black wins




*Dia. 4: wrong
4: connects*

Dia. 3. After 10, Black makes a throw-in, then


squeezes, winning the fight by one move. This was a long sequence, but all the moves were forced.

Dia. 4. Sacrificing the second stone is important. If Black starts squeezing too soon with 1 and 3, he loses the fight.

Dia. 5. When White ataris at 1, Black must not answer by squeezing with 2 and 4, as this gives White a chance to find a counter.



Dia. 5: wrong
5: connects




Dia. 6: White wins

Dia. 6. White can use 7 and 9 to increase his liberties, putting him ahead in the fight. Of course, Black could play a ko with 8 at 'a', but this is a poor second to the correct answer.


Answer to Problem 8

Dia. 1. According to the go proverb, 'two hanes increase your liberties by one', so Black hanes at 1.


Dia. 2. White has no choice but to give way with 2, so Black plays 3. He now wins the fight whatever White does.




Dia. 1: following the proverb



Dia. 2: Black wins



Dia. 3: Black wins




Dia. 4: Black wins


Dia. 3. If White throws in at 1, Black just ignores him, filling a liberty on the other side. Confirm for yourself that he wins.

Dia. 4. White tries to confuse White with the placement at 1, but once again Black should just ignore him. If Black connects on either side of 1, he will lose.

Dia. 5. It's tempting to fill in a liberty with 1, but that lets White get an approach-move ko with 2.



Dia. 5: ko




Dia. 6: White can't resist

Dia. 6. To go back to the start, the reason why White can't block at 2 is that he has no answer to Black 3.


Answer to Problem 9

Dia. 1. Black 1 may look a little strange at first sight, but this is the vital point; it follows the first principle of capturing races, which is to reduce your opponent's liberties.


Dia. 2. The best White can do is to descend at 2, but Black forces with 3, then descends at 5. It's all over; whatever White does, Black can atari him with his next move.




Dia. 1: the vital point



Dia. 2: Black is ahead



Dia. 3: Black wins




Dia. 4: Black wins


Dia. 3. If White 6, Black 7 —

Dia. 4. And vice versa. Winning the fight by attacking on the inside like this is a little unusual.

Dia. 5. The unimaginative move of 1 lets White get a ko. Instead of 3 —



Dia. 5: failure




Dia. 6: worst

Dia. 6. If Black 3 here, White wins the fight outright.


Answer to Problem 10

Dia. 1. The placement at 1 is the move. In this shape it is a famous tesuji for reducing White's liberties as quickly as possible. As the proverb says, 'the 2-1 point is often the vital point in corner fights'.


Dia. 2. If White intercepts at 2, Black hanes at 3 and wins the fight.




Dia. 1: the vital point



Dia. 2: Black wins



Dia. 3: continuation




Dia. 4: Black wins


Dia. 3. If White keeps playing, about all he can do is to hane at 4, but after Black 5 White loses whatever he does. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 4. White 4 here makes no difference, as Black has time to play on the inside at 7.

Dia. 5. The hane at 1 shows that Black is in too much of a hurry. The 1-3 combination is often a good way of destroying the opponent's eye shape, but not in a capturing race. After 4 —



Dia. 5: the wrong tesuji



Dia. 6: Black loses.


Dia. 6. This time Black loses the capturing race, as he can't atari on either side after White 10.

(From supplements to 'Igo Club', March 1985 and October 1987.)


36 Life and Death Patterns: Answers

Continued from page 30

Answer to Problem 10.



Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 1. As the proverb advises, White reduces Black's room for making eyes with the hane at 1, then destroys the eye shape inside with a placement at the vital point. This is one of the classic patterns for killing a group. [It wasn't appropriate in the final problem in the preceding article, but


here there's no capturing race involved.] Note that 3 at 'a' would be bad, as it would let Black get a ko by taking the vital point of 3 himself.

Dia. 2. Starting with the placement at 1 is a mistake: Black has a clever answer at 2, which makes miai of living with Black 3 and getting a seki with 4. Since the seki is gote for White, he will be quite disappointed.


Dia. 3. The clamp at 1 is, though not correct, at least better than 1 in Dia. 2. This way the best that Black can do is to get a ko. Since he is short of liberties, Black can't get an oi-otoshi (that is, by making an atari above 1 after White captures 4.)

Dia. 4. The placement at 1 doesn't achieve

much. When Black intercepts with 2, the best White can get is a gote seki. That makes it a mere endgame move.



Dia. 3: ko



Dia. 4: gote seki


Answer to Problem 11

Dia. 1. The white group looks as if almost any move would kill it, but the only move that does so unconditionally is the hane at 1. If next White 'a', Black makes a placement at 'b'; if instead White 'c', Black plays at 'd'. Please confirm for yourself that in both cases White dies.


It may be helpful to remember that the six-point corner position made by the four marked white stones is a dead shape — regardless of whether White has any liberties open and whether he has made a hane at the bottom.

Let's confirm that other moves don't work.


Dia. 2. If Black 1, White 2 makes miai of 3 and 4, so White lives easily.




Dia. 1: the only move



Dia. 2: alive



Dia. 3: seki



Dia. 4: ko

Dia. 3. If Black 1, White answers at 2 and gets a seki. Note that White has too much space inside for Black to get a bent-four.


Dia. 4. Black 1 looks like a good point to make a placement, but the best Black can do is to get a ko. Regardless of whether White answers at 2 or at 'a', all variations end in a ko.

Answer to Problem 12


Dia. 1. Black reduces White's eye space with 1, then plays at the vital point of 3. There is now no way for White to get two eyes. Note the importance of the timing: if Black plays 5 at 7, White gets a ko with White 5.

Dia. 2. If Black starts out with 1, White gets a ko after 2 to 6. However, this is a 'ten thousand year ko', that is, it will be very hard for White to take the plunge and start it. He will have to fill in the inside liberty at 'a', but then Black will get to take the ko first, which will give him the opportunity to create the dead 'gomoku-nakade' (five-space big eye) shape by connecting at 4. If White does nothing, the result is a seki. White, of course, will be satisfied with this, so the result is a failure for Black.


If Black switches 1 to 'a' or 3, White lives unconditionally.




Dia. 1: dead



Dia. 2: mannen-ko



Dia. 3: alive



Dia. 4: ko

Dia. 3. If Black bluntly ataris at 3, White will surprise him with the counter at 4, which secures unconditional life (please work out the continuation for yourself). Whenever you play an atari, you must consider the possibility of the opponent's not connecting.

Dia. 4. If Black makes the placement at 3, White can get a ko with 4 and 6. If White had a hane in place at 'a', this would be the correct answer.

('Let's Go', April 1983.)

43rd Honinbo Title

This year's Honinbo title match witnessed a dramatic clash between two artists of the go board. Standing steadfastly against the tide of territorial go that dominates the modern go scene, Takemiya and Otake represent different values, above all, the conviction that the go player is a craftsman and that a game of go is an artistic creation that transcends the mundane question of winning or losing.

In practice, the difference between the two is that Takemiya usually plays on the star-points and goes for centre moyos, while Otake favours the 3-4 point, starting slowly and building thickness that he uses to overhaul the opponent later in the game.

As it turned out, Takemiya seemed to be in

the better form in this year's title match, getting a favourable position in most of the games, but Otake played with great determination and tenacity, making the match go the full distance. His challenge was the most serious threat to Takemiya's domination of this title since he made his second comeback in it in 1985.

This was the first title match between Otake and Takemiya. The career record between them prior to the match was 13-7 in Otake's favour, but most of Takemiya's losses came in the early part of his career (he was only able to win two of their first ten games). Recently the results have been more even and in fact Takemiya won their most important previous clash, the 1986 playoff to decide the 11th Kisei challenger.



Otake: 'If you can play in a best-of-seven once a year, then life as a go-player is worth living.' This was actually his first best-of-seven since 1984, when his challenge for the 9th Meijin title was rebuffed 4-3 by Cho. With 36 titles to date, Otake has enjoyed success second only to Sakata, but he has been jinxed in the Honinbo title; his record of only five league appearances in his whole career is a miserable one for a player of his stature and compares badly with his success in the Meijin title.

Takemiya on Otake: 'His go is very lucid. He's quick-witted, a skilful fighter or, to put it a bad way, cunning. But don't you think my go is more flexible?'



Takemiya: 'It's 30 years since I started to play go — I want to put everything I've learnt over the years into this series.' Takemiya consistently maintains that the way you play, your feeling about your game, is more important than the result. 'If you worry too much about the result, then you find yourself unable to play the moves you want to play.' That's why, while he accepts the nickname 'cosmic style' for his game, he prefers 'the Takemiya natural style'.

Otake on Takemiya: 'His go is full of tremendous power. You couldn't play that kind of game, like a whole-board life-and-death problem, without reading ability and power.'

Game One

For this commentary on the first game, *Kido* magazine asked Sakata Eio, Honorary Honinbo, and Takagi Shoichi 9-dan, who, as referee and game commentator respectively, accompanied the players to Paris, to analyse the game. The reporter for *Kido* is Akiyama Kenji.

White: Otake Hideo 9-dan

Black: Takemiya Masaki Honinbo

Played in Paris on 10, 11 May 1988.





Figure 1 (1-41)



Dia. 1: the old warhorse

Figure 1 (1-41). Otake's slack start

Sakata: The two-space high pincer of 9 is unusual, isn't it? The one-space low pincer is Takemiya's speciality, but maybe he's got tired of doing the same thing all the time.

Takagi: The two-space high pincer was incredibly popular in the mid-50's. Starting with Sakata Sensei, Go Seigen, Takagawa, Sugiuchi. . . What will happen if White uses 10 to invade at the 3-3 point?

Sakata: I suppose White will connect solidly at 5 in *Dia. 1*, though there are various possibilities.

Takagi: Black will either seal White in with 8 or push along at 6; if the latter, we get something like the result to 12. Jumping to 10 in the game keeps things simple. The knight's move of 15 is just about absolutely necessary, I suppose.

Sakata: White 16 — I guess this gives a reasonable game. An approach move at 'a' also looks good.


Takagi: If White invades at 'a', what about White's stone at 6? Rather than having it here, wouldn't an enclosure then be better?

Sakata: I see. Maybe you're right. White decides to try the 16-18 combination.

Takagi: Black 19 to 23 are natural, but Otake called the jump to 24 the losing move.

Sakata: Eh? The losing move? That can't be.

Takagi: That's just Otake's way of putting it. He said that White should have played 1 in *Dia. 2*; if Black 2, he jumps sideways with 3 and 5, then encloses the corner with 7.



Dia. 2: better for 24?

Sakata: I see. I guess this is more interesting. He really jumped a lot in the game. It's too straightforward. Even so, it's hard to say one way or the other. Because White is erasing the black moyo.

Takagi: Miyamoto Naoki, who came with us to Paris, suggested playing 28 at 1 in *Dia. 3*.

Sakata: Instead of defending, Black will bluntly cut with 2 and 4. Is White safe?

Takagi: It looks unreasonable for White. Even if he cuts at 7, Black counters with 8 and 10.

Sakata: I considered White 1 in *Dia. 4*.

Takagi: If Black 2?

Sakata: White plays 3 and just pushes down.


Takagi: It looks OK for White.

Sakata: So Black will probably answer at 2 in *Dia. 5*. White backtracks at 3, then takes up position with 5.


Takagi: I think it's better than the game. However, Otake doesn't seem to like this kind of amorphous position.

Sakata: If you compare the two stones White


28 and 30 with Black 29 and 31, anyone would agree that Black is doing better.



Dia. 3: unreasonable



Dia. 4: Sakata's suggestion



Dia. 5: superior to the game?

Takagi: That's right. I couldn't believe it when Otake played 34 and 36 after playing 28 and 30. You'd expect him to play 34 and 36 immediately, but, putting White 28 aside, it's obvious that the 30-31 exchange would have been better left unplayed.

Sakata: Can White keep pace this way? Takemiya must have been overflowing with gratitude.

Takagi: This kind of patience is beyond ordinary mortals like myself. Perhaps you could say that it's typical of Otake.

Sakata: Maybe he was playing cautiously. Because it was the first game — and in Paris, moreover . . . Or does playing in Paris have nothing to do with it? (laughter) You could see it as a certain kind of fighting spirit.

Takagi: In one sense, being able to play patiently is a good thing, but still I can't approve.




パリで本因坊戦
—このくらいのことやってよ!

Otake and Takemiya are urged by the cartoonist Ayusawa Makoto to get into a Parisian mood. (The detail that neither smokes — in fact, Takemiya is a vehement antismoker — is ignored.) This was the first Honinbo game to be played overseas and the first Japanese title game to go to Europe.

Sakata: I've often been tricked by Otake. He plays so very leisurely at the start that he seems to have no fighting spirit, but then there's a rude awakening . . .

Takagi: I thought that for Black 37 the high pincer at 1 in *Dia. 6* would have been better.




Dia. 6: the high pincer

Sakata: I suppose White would play 2 to 6. Is this so good for Black — putting aside the question of the territorial balance?

Takagi: But in this variation White doesn't even begin to get a counterattack. He looks like losing badly.

Sakata: That's true. White's start was just too bad. Even Black 37 and 39 are good enough, it



Dia. 7: not the Otake style

seems. I wondered about White 40. What if he simply extends to 'b'?

Takagi: Will Black run into the corner with 1 in *Dia. 7*? Playing along the top with 2 would, to express it Otake-style, 'feel horrible' — because White has run along the top edge with the low (marked) stone.

Sakata: It does feel horrible. I have a feeling I understand. But splitting open the side with 41 simplifies the game.





Figure 2 (42-80)



Dia. 8: feasible

Dia. 9: aggressive

Figure 2 (42-80). Takemiya starts to coast.

Sakata: If White doesn't do something dramatic, like 48, he won't be in the game.

Akiyama: Instead of 49, couldn't Black attach at 1 in *Dia. 8*?

Takagi: I thought about this — it's quite a powerful move. If White 2, Black fights with 3 and 5. It's difficult for White to decide how to develop the fight after 9. But Black probably

didn't want to do anything because he felt he was ahead.

Sakata: He doesn't want to take any chances with his lead.

Takagi: He can't be bothered with detailed analysis. That's how far he's ahead.

Sakata: White 54 was the sealed move. Apparently this is quite a good move. I have doubts about Black 55. I'd like to push along once with 1 in *Dia. 9*.


Takagi: White will still reinforce with 2.

Sakata: Black jumps to 3 — this is good enough. If White 4, Black keeps up the pressure with 5. Black 'a' is now a threat.

Takagi: There's a possibility of failure, but this is how I would have wanted to play. If White blocks at 2 in *Dia. 10*, Black takes the precaution of playing the forcing move at 3, then he can attack in a number of ways. For example, he could aim at the placement at 5 . . . Sakata: Black also has the attack at 'a'.

Takagi: Accepting Black 55 as OK, what about Black 57? In a spiritual sense, you might be able to call it the losing move. Sakata Sensei, I imagine you'd never play a move like this all your life.

Sakata: I wouldn't — it's too much of a waste. Takemiya was playing as if he was on holiday. [After the game Takemiya expressed considerable regret over 57, saying that there was no need to play this forcing move at this stage. The presence of 58 helps White a lot when Black attaches at 7 in Figure 4.]



Dia. 10: tough for White

Takagi: The moves from 59 on may feel good, but these points are worthless.

Sakata: He just played on dame points. The game wasn't bad for him, but I thought it had got

a lot closer.

Takagi: Otake said later that it was still a lost game for him.

Sakata: You can't take what he says at face value. If you do, you're in trouble.

Takagi: With 75 Black faces a difficult decision. It didn't occur to me, but perhaps entering at the 3-3 point was a good move.

Sakata: The continuation seems reasonable.





Figure 3 (81-102)



Dia. 11: Black's missed opportunity

Figure 3 (81-102). Takemiya is much too complacent.

Takagi: The problem point comes up with White 88. Black 89 is absurd. I wonder what he was thinking of.

Sakata: He wasn't thinking.


Takagi: If you lose [after playing a move like this], you'll come in for all sorts of abuse.

Sakata: That's right. Go would be an easy game if you could win with a move like this.

Takagi: I think this is Black's chance to force with 1 in *Dia. 11*. He could then link up with 5.

Sakata: I see. He can look forward to Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. This would spell trouble for White. What about the thinness of the centre black group — is it safe? It will be painful for White if he can't inflict some damage on it.

Takagi: I considered various possibilities, but there don't seem to be any severe moves. If, for example, White peeps at 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black pushes through at 2. Even supposing White cuts, it shouldn't be hard for the top and bottom parts of the group to live separately. There's no obvious way for White to do damage.



Dia. 12: Black copes with the attack.

Sakata: The marked black stones work effectively. If there isn't some monster lurking here, Black is ahead. Takemiya should have woken up to the seriousness of the situation and sat down and had a proper think here.

Takagi: Winning with a majestic, good-aji move like 89 is the Takemiya Honinbo-style, but as far as this move is concerned it backfired. At the public commentary I said that Takemiya was an optimist both at go and as a person. I hope the audience understood.

Sakata: This was awful. He hadn't made an evaluation of the overall position. He was probably so overjoyed by the start.

Takagi: You never know, he might still have thought that he was ahead.

Sakata: Black is playing on nothing but dame points. Having White swallow up the black stone with 96 is terrible.

Takagi: The idea of discarding this black stone would never occur to me.

Sakata: It wouldn't occur to anyone. It's beyond the understanding of us common mortals.

Takagi: If you like, you could say that it's typical of Takemiya. (laughter) Actually even Takemiya recognized that the game was lost when this stone was captured.

Sakata: In that case, you would have expected him to do something about it before it was captured.

Takagi: Playing 99 and 101 after getting stones at 91 and 93 is like springing into action after the crisis is over.





Figure 4 (103-143)



Dia. 13: unreasonable

Figure 4 (103-143). *A rude awakening*

Takagi: The game is now a toss-up on the board. Takemiya must have been crestfallen. He was in a holiday mood, yet before he knew it the game had turned into a loss.

Sakata: The bottom black area is 40 points. It doesn't even match the one white area on the left side, so the figures don't add up for Black. He'd have to play really hard even to get a win on the board.

Takagi: Black goes all out with 7 to 11, but it's painful to have to add a stone at 17. If he tries to capture on a large scale with 1 in Dia. 13, White rips off a stone after 2 and 4.

Sakata: Otake plays very skilfully after this. Look at how unpleasant 36 is. If Black plays 37 at A, White can omit 38.

Takagi: In this game Takemiya seems to have let Otake dictate the pace. That applies even to the way he used his time.

Sakata: That's right. Basically he's a slow player, yet he played really fast at the vital points.




Figure 5 (144-176)

Figure 5 (144-176). *Not the real Takemiya*

Takagi: Perhaps holding the Honinbo game in Paris made Takemiya overdo the festive mood. Losing like this usually has a bad effect on you.

Sakata: It might influence the later games in the match.

Takagi: But in Takemiya's case you can't say. He just forgets everything bad. He might start playing seriously from the second game.

Sakata: I'll be interested to see how he uses his time from now on. His strong point is that he takes his time on each move and carefully works out his strategy. If he lets Otake decide the pace, he'll be in danger. Judging just by this game, Otake is more psyched up for the match.

Black resigns after White 176.

After this analysis was concluded, Takemiya appeared in the pressroom at the Nihon Ki-in.

Takemiya: I went to Spain after Paris. Spain was great. It matches my personality exactly. I'd like to live there.

Takagi: We were insulting you just now.

Takemiya: This game was terrible. Otake plays so as not to let me show my strength — it's

painful. He said before the match that he wanted to make me display the Takemiya-style power to the fullest, but he does the opposite. He's a cunning rascal.

(*'Kido'*, July 1988.)



Otake takes advantage of Takemiya's natural optimism to get off to a good start in the match. Once again Takemiya has no luck in an overseas title game: he's also lost to Cho Chikun in Korea (9th Kisei) and to Kobayashi Koichi in Los Angeles (11th Kisei).

Game Two

White: Takemiya

Black: Otake

Played in Gero hot spring, Gifu prefecture, on 26, 27 May 1988.

Commentary by Kato Masao.

You can't expect us go players always to maintain the same level. We have our ups and downs. As far as age goes, most players reach their peak somewhere around the age of 30; once you pass 40, things don't always go so well for you.

I've also entered my forties, but Rin and Otake are halfway through them. We can only guess at the unseen efforts they make to maintain the level they have reached; this effort must be quite considerable. With this in mind, I was eager to see what kind of go Otake, making his first appearance for some time in one of the top three titles, would show us. However, this second game developed in a strange way.

Figure 1 (1–50). *A plump territory*

White 18 is a forcing move; if Black later

peeps at 'a', White can answer at 38.

Black 23 is a leisurely move. I would prefer the kosumi of Black 26; if White 'b', Black jumps sideways to 30, forcing White to add a move at the top. I'm not necessarily saying that this is better than the game, but with 26 to 30 Takemiya does get the kind of plump territory he likes. His position has a relaxed feel to it. The joseki in the bottom right corner may be unusual for Takemiya, who as a rule plays the star-point, but the kind of sure, steady development seen in this opening is his favourite strategy with White.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Black 37–White 42. There is nothing unusual about this forcing sequence. Just how weak is this white group? How will the fight with the centre black stones go? These questions will be the focus of the game.

Black 45. White 46 is a vital point, so it would be tempting to crawl at 46 with Black 45. White would then play White 45. It's hard to choose between this variation and the strategy in the figure.







Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 1: severer than Black 57

Figure 2 (51-100). *Building useless thickness*


Black 57 is unbelievably slack. If Black wants to strengthen his centre group, he should do so with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1*. This takes a bite at the white group while strengthening Black. He could then connect at 7 and wait to see what White does. This is the kind of severity that is called for.

In the game the stone at 57 didn't prove very effective. The thickness it makes doesn't help Black to mount an attack on White; it just makes him needlessly thick. If it was a mistake in judgment, then what can you say? These things happen.


Takemiya must have felt grateful anyway. He promptly played the 62-64 combination. The reinforcement at 65 is necessary. Instead —

Dia. 2. If, for example, Black presses at 1, White will immediately play the clamp tesuji of 2. White makes quite a dent in Black's area at the bottom, then reduces from the top with 6. This is hopeless, but —

Dia. 3. Resisting with 3 is unreasonable. When White cuts at 4, the continuation is forced. The fight after 10 is clearly favourable for White. After 13, White attaches at 'a'.




Dia. 2: an easy win for White



Dia. 3: resistance futile

Black 65 was the sealed move on the first day. At this stage White already had a definite lead. The next day it was enough for White to build up his territory step by step with simple moves like 66 and 68. These moves are evidence of Takemiya's confidence in his position.

Otake tried attacking with the capping move of 71, but Takemiya simply moved out with 72, splitting Black's forces into two.



Dia. 4: making a game of it

When White jumped down to 78, the game was lost for Black. The profit taken by 75 and 77 did not maintain a balance. At the least, Black

could have tried the knight's move of 'a' instead of 73. However, the real problem was with 71. If Black had blocked White's path through the centre by attaching at 1 in *Dia. 4*, the game, while bad, would not yet have been hopeless. However, there's no guarantee that White will hane at 2.

There is nothing to say about the game after White 78.




Figure 3 (101-130)

Figure 3 (101-130). A Takemiya masterpiece

Playing through this game makes you think that both the players must have confidence in their shinogi (saving weak groups) ability. Neither side make much of an attempt to attack the other. Each kept his innate strength too much in reserve. I expect to see more of their explosive power in the following games.

Recently Otake has been switching from thickness to territory. I wonder how this secret transformation will shape his games.

Be that as it may, this game was a Takemiya masterpiece.

Black resigns after White 130.

(‘Kido’, July 1988.)

Game Three

Takemiya's brilliant use of thickness

White: Otake

Black: Takemiya

Played at Takaragaike, Kyoto City, on 8, 9 June 1988.

Commentary by Takemiya. Text by Kobori Keiji.




Figure 1 (1-14)

Figure 1 (1-14). The limitless possibilities of the sanren-sei

Takemiya: ‘The star-point suits my taste. I’m sure the fans think that the niren-sei and the sanren-sei are simple, that their advantage is that they have few variations. But that’s not really true. The variations are, after all, limitless. No matter how much you think, you won’t come to the end of them.’

After a conventional start, Otake answers Black 9 with White 10 and 12 and time stops. Which will Takemiya play — the solid or the diagonal connection? Or will he switch to an approach move on the bottom left?


The move Takemiya chose, after prolonged thought (his really slow play began in this game), was the extra-large knight’s move of 13.

Takemiya: ‘It’s probably better for Black to have the moves from 5 to 8 (Figure 1) on the board before playing on the left side. Connecting solidly with 13 at ‘a’, then extending to ‘b’, is a strategy that gives responsibility to this part of the board. In contrast, Black 13 only has light, slight responsibility. It makes miai of the top and the left side and is open and flexible. It’s rich in variations.’

With his sanren-sei in the background, Black avoids committing himself here. He puts the onus on White to decide. If Takemiya prefers a supple game, Otake’s stones are like steel. He works best building positions that are rock-solid. The subsequent fuseki presents a vivid contrast.

Otake extended solidly at 14. It was if he was saying to Black, ‘You can do whatever you like.’

The strategy of *Dia. 1*, which pits moyo against moyo, is also feasible, but perhaps this is not to Otake's liking.



Dia. 1: competing moyos





Figure 2 (15-50)

Figure 2 (15-50). *If a pro's first instinct is wrong —*


With 15 to 19, Takemiya builds a large moyo on the left side. It works well with the sanren-sei moyo on the right, setting up a two-front strategy.

Takemiya: 'Instead of 15, I also considered the shoulder hit at 'a'. Expanding the moyo like this would be a little unimaginative, but it would have a certain grandeur. I'd like to give readers a word of advice. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* make the moyo too narrow. White will play 4 and 6: Black looks like losing immediately.'

The meaning of White 18 is to curb the growth of the moyo. It can't be omitted because Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3* would be much too good.



Dia. 2: a good way to lose




Dia. 3: perfect for Black

Takemiya: 'I had trouble making up my mind about 19. You can see what a fantastic point 20 is. So, my first instinct was to play Black 20. But when you're actually playing the game, answering White 18 with Black 20 feels submissive, so psychologically you don't want to play it. So I put the stone down at 19, which in the local context is a magnificent move. Even so, one's first instinct is generally correct, you know. Black 20 was perhaps, when all is said and done, the most natural move. If a pro's first instinct is not correct, there's no hope for him.'



White 22 is the solid Otake style. It will provide support when he makes an assault on the black moyo.

White 28 is not a bolt from the blue: Black has been expecting it. That doesn't make finding an answer any easier, and in fact Takemiya had second thoughts about his move. Since this is the key point of the opening, we shall look at it in detail. There were four main alternative strategies that Takemiya considered.

1. Black can seal White in by attaching at 1 in *Dia. 4*, letting him live on a small scale. Black continues with the 'a-b' combination, so he makes up for the damage suffered on the side.



Dia. 4: letting White live small



Dia. 5: compromise Dia. 6: aggressive

2. This is a variation. Instead of 3 in Dia. 4, Black could give way with 3 and 5 in Dia. 5. Black 7 secures the capture of the centre invader, so this result is 50-50.


3. Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 6, emphasizing attack, are tempting. This way, if White 'a', Black gives way with 'b'.

4. Instead of 1 in Dia. 6, Black presses at 'c', making a kind of leaning attack.

Takemiya: 'The move I actually played, the jump to 29, was too sedate. My opponent had staked his fate on the invasion; I should have played with equal seriousness, going all out myself. I seem to have let White off too easily here.'

With 36 it is White's turn to take aim at the thinness of the opponent. Takemiya: 'This move was dubious: Black made up his lost ground when he jumped to 37. White was trying too hard. If he had slid into the right side with 1 to 5 in Dia. 7, he would have had a promising game.'

[Otake made the same comment after the game; he called 36 the losing move.]



Dia. 7: superior for White

White 50. If at 'b', Black will play the clamp tesuji of 'c'. White captures the two centre black stones and succeeds in settling his centre group, but —





Figure 3 (51-100)

Figure 3 (51-100). Winning the peaceful way

Black is satisfied with his result in the centre fight when he gets to push through at 59, which makes him very thick in the centre.

Black 71. Takemiya: 'This was an important decision. I yielded with 71, as I thought that the game was not bad for me, but perhaps I should have played in a more manly fashion, intercepting boldly with 1 in Dia. 8 (next page).' Black lets White live in the corner and takes compensation by invading with 9 to 13. White's positions here are quite thin. Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c' is

half sente against the corner; in the centre Black can aim at striking with Black 'd'—White 'e'—Black 'f'.



Dia. 8: more manly


Faced with a strategic choice between territory and attack, Takemiya chose the former, confident it offered a sure win. His plan was to wrap up the game as quickly as possible.

Black 73 etc. surprised fellow professionals, as this forcing sequence helps White just as much as Black. If you lost the game after playing like this, you would come in for a lot of criticism.


Black 87. Takemiya: 'I should first have exchanged Black 'a' for White 'b'. Black lost a little when White made the good answer at 88?'

White 92. White 'c' is also big.

Black 95. Black could also play 97 or he could attack with Black 'd'—White 'e'—Black 'f'. Takemiya consistently chooses the more peaceful course.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (101–161). *Takemiya wraps the game up.*

Black 5 helps reinforce against the threat of White 12, followed by White 30. The exchange for 6 costs Black points and erases aji (potential) at the top, but Black is confident that switching to 7 secures his lead.

Black 15. Takemiya: 'When White played 14, Black had to attach at 'a'. That would have made

my lead more definite. White 22 made Otake's loss certain, as it lost sente. White should have forced with 22 at 23.' (If he had done so, he would have been only one and a half points behind.)




Figure 4 (101–161)

White 32. Without Black 5 on the board, White would be able to connect at 33, as demonstrated in *Dia. 9*.

The sequence from 35 is very skilful. Compared to the conventional endgame play of Black 48, followed by Black 53, White gets the same amount of territory, but Black gains by being able to play 51 in sente. Note that if White plays 46 at 1 in *Dia. 10*, Black will get a seki.




Figure 5 (162–221)

118: ko (at 68); 120: connects (at 115); 121: connects (at 90)



Takemiya goes into the lead.

Figure 5 (162–221). One up

White 62. White 63 would gain two points extra, but this is irrelevant to the outcome.

This game was a convincing win for Black; he used his thickness so effectively that he didn't have to seek any quarrels in the latter part of the game. Otake's bad form was beginning to worry his fans.

Black wins by 4 1/2 points.

Game Four

This game shows Otake attempting, not always successfully, to counter the Takemiya centre strategy. Right from the outset he strove to lead the game along the lines likely to be least pleasing to his opponent. His play shows that even for artists of the go board psychological warfare plays a part. In contrast to the Kajiwara approach of playing the board, not the opponent, Otake passed up some of his own favourite strategies to avoid letting the game develop into the kind of centre game that Takemiya likes. He even slowed down his usual quick pace to match Takemiya's more deliberate rate of play. Takemiya ended up with a centre moyo regardless, but on this occasion Otake's greater tenacity paid off.

White: Takemiya

Black: Otake

Played in Tokuyama City on 16, 17 June 1988.

Commentary by Otake.

Figure 1 (1–25). Nipping the moyo in the bud

Since it was my turn to take black, defying

Takemiya by playing a sanren-sei myself would make for an interesting game, but . . .




Figure 1 (1–25)


White ignores Black 5 and makes an approach move at 6: Takemiya is always trying something new in his fuseki.

Instead of 7, a second approach move at 'a' or a pincer at 'b' would be more positive, but they didn't appeal to me, as I have tried them both a number of times.


Instead of 11, I could have tried Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', but Takemiya would probably have been happy to see the game become a moyo contest. The aim of 11 is to prevent him from setting up a large moyo — it's a kind of nuisance tactic.

White 14 looks forward to White 20, so per-

haps I should have played 19 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. If the moves to 11 follow, this stifles the Takemiya style and looks more interesting than the game.



Dia. 1: better than 19?



Dia. 2: good for White

Black 21. If at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White builds a strong wall with no defects in it. The exchange of 21 for 22 is obviously bad in the local context, but I reasoned that Takemiya would be unhappy at having to play low with 24.






Figure 2 (26-65)



Dia. 3: bad for Black



Dia. 4: correct for 35

Figure 2 (26-65). *Otake plays patiently.*

Black 27. Since the ladder is good (that is, after White 'a' through to White 'e'), one is naturally tempted to attach here. As far as a white ladder block in the top left is concerned,

there doesn't seem to be anything really frightening.


White 28 is big. If Black were to play here first, he would play Black 'f', White 'g', Black 64. With 29 I was ruled by my emotions. Even though it is somewhat submissive, Black 30 is after all big.

Black 31. Defending at 32 would probably be more solid, but somehow it feels slow. Other pros didn't think highly of Black 31, but I believed that this was the only way to play.

Black 35 was terrible. At first, I thought that answering White 36 with 1 in *Dia. 3* would be reasonable, but in fact the result would be bad for Black when White linked up with 2 to 12. My mind was a blur: I misread the position and also hallucinated.

With 35 I should have attached at 1 in *Dia. 4*. If White 2, Black just connects at 3, leaving the peep at 'a'. Even if White cuts with 4 to 8, Black gets a reasonable result to 13, as White has to add a stone in the corner.

Being forced to play a move like 37 in spite of the fact that Black originally wanted to aim at the peep at 'h' means that the game is already lost. Playing 37 at 39 is bad because of White 2 to 6 in *Dia. 5*.



Dia. 5: bad for Black

I thought for over two and a half hours about the sealed move of 47, but perhaps because I was getting tired, my mind was a haze and I couldn't organize my thoughts. If it were a fast game, I would probably have used 47 to defend at 52 on the right side. That way the territorial balance would have been reasonable, but I was worried about having my group on the top left attacked. [According to *Go Weekly*, Otake spent two hours 33 minutes on 47. Since he went past the scheduled finishing time for the first day, he told Takemiya to leave ahead of him (etiquette more or less requires the other player to wait while his opponent is thinking about the sealed move). At first Otake kept muttering to himself, 'Will it die?'

It looks like dying.' After a while that changed to, 'Should I just let it die?', so obviously he was strongly tempted to play elsewhere.]


Black 57. Black could link up with 1 in *Dia. 6*, but White will also link up with 8, and the fight on the outside looks more awkward for Black.

The White 58–Black 59 exchange eliminates the threat of Black 'i'.


White 60 was, unusually, a move that Takemiya Honinbo spent no time on, but it was dubious. He should have descended at 1 in *Dia. 7*; after Black 2 and White 3, Black will have trouble working out how to connect at the top.

White's shape is still thin after 60 and 62; Black takes the honours in this exchange with his profit up to 65.


Notwithstanding this, White is still in the lead.



Dia. 6: good for White



Dia. 7: good for White



Dia. 8: better for White




Figure 3 (66–109)

Figure 3 (66–109). Suddenly a moyo materializes.

Black 69 looks painful, but it reduces White's potential territory, so it has some substance.

Black 71 had to be one line higher, at 74. Even if one plays high, Takemiya is not the kind of opponent to come burrowing low inside one's position. Here I am teaching Takemiya counterstrategies: forgetting to play them when I had the chance is hopeless.

With 72 to 78, a white moyo suddenly materializes in the centre.

White 80 and 82 are also the Takemiya style, but I was more worried about the prospect of an attack on the black group above.

White 84. Playing the ordinary sequence to 5 in *Dia. 8* would secure the centre territory, but presumably Takemiya didn't like the idea of letting the black group get settled so easily.


White 88. White could have taken away Black's eye shape at once with 'a', but White probably didn't have confidence that he could have killed the group after Black 'b'.

I was very happy when I got an eye on the side in sente, thanks to the sacrifice of 91 and 93. That's why I would have found being attacked as in *Dia. 8* more disagreeable. In contrast to this diagram, Black can reduce the centre with Black 'b', White 'c'.

When I played the forcing sequence from 97 to 107, I thought that this group was out of danger, but actually I was making an oversight. According to my analysis, even if White attacked my eye shape with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9* (next page), Black may not be able to get eyes here, but he can live by attacking the corner with 4 to 8. If White plays 7 to link up, Black is alive after 8; if instead White 7 at 'a', then Black plays a ko after Black 'b', White 'c', Black 7. Since this ko would affect the life and death of White's corner group, he can't afford to play it.

However, White had a much more frighten-

ing move than 7 in Dia. 9, so really I had to add a reinforcement with 109. With his next move Takemiya missed his chance to kill me.



Dia. 9: Black lives?





Figure 4 (110-160)



Dia. 10: Otake's oversight

Figure 4 (110-160). *Takemiya misses his chance to kill the group.*

White 110 was Takemiya's chance to wrap up the game.

Dia. 10. If White had destroyed my eye shape with 1 and 3, the game would probably have been over. I had overlooked the clever tesuji of White 7. If Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', then White throws in at 'b' and Black can't get an eye in sente. White will link up with 'd', so the question

becomes whether Black can save the group by playing around 'e'. Seeing White 7 would probably have upset me so much that there's no way I would have played it correctly. When you've made an oversight, it's only natural that your group should die.

Black 17 is smaller than it looks: Black should reinforce his large group by attaching at 32. With Black 32 in place, he wouldn't have to worry about Dia. 10. If White ataried at 17 at the bottom, Black could be content to answer at 'a', as he would get a satisfying peep at 56.

White 18 and 20 are the losing moves. White should of course attack as in Dia. 10; failing that, he should at least surround the centre with White 48, Black 49, White 35. When Black gets stones at 19 and 21, he can make an eye in the centre.


Black 31. With this move Black has probably upset White's lead.

White 32. Apparently Takemiya made a miscalculation here: he thought 32 was sente against Black's group. That is to say, he believed that he could destroy Black's centre eye, but the group was alive as it stood. For that matter, if White can destroy the centre eye, he should proceed to do so immediately with 32. Like myself, Takemiya seems to have been unaware of the tesuji of 7 in Dia. 10.

White 32 did take respectable profit, but in gote, so White should have enclosed the centre with White 33. Even so, at this point the game was probably already a win for Black.

White 42. Even if White attacks Black's eye shape with White 55, Black has no problems after 'b'.

Black 43 is the key move for securing an eye on the side. To go back a bit, even if White had attacked the eye shape with 1 in *Dia. 11*, Black can get an eye, provided he doesn't forget to play 2 first. Please confirm for yourself that if he carelessly answers 1 at 4, White plays 2 and Black loses the eye.



Dia. 11: the eye-making tesuji

White 48. If White connects at 'c', Black lives with 55.

I have nothing in particular to say about the endgame after 50.




Figure 5 (161–200)




Figure 6 (201–240)

36: connects (above 34); 37: connects (at 24);
38: ko (at 8); 40: connects (at 23)

Figure 5, Figure 6. A lucky win?

Kido: We interviewed you before the series began [see photo caption on the first page of this report]. How do you feel now, after the 4th game?

Otake: Things don't turn out the way one says they will. My engine's not kicking over properly — I can't help feeling irritated with myself.

Kido: Going by the press reports of what you and Takemiya have said after each game, it

seems that the series has been a really bad one for you so far. Is that the real truth?

Otake: Everyone has a different way of expressing himself. All I can do is leave it to the judgement of the fans.

Kido: The match now becomes a best-of-three. How do you feel about it?

Otake: The story of the first four games is in one's head, so you can't make a completely new start. Rather than that, I think it's a good thing that being down to the last three games creates a real sense of tension. Having felt nausea during this game, it's really come home to me that I'm in the thick of a seven-game series. [Otake was sick a couple of times during the fourth game.] All I ask of myself is that I play go that I can be satisfied with in the remaining games. The real fight has only just begun.

Black wins by 6 1/2 points.
(‘Kido’, August 1988)



Otake was a little lucky to win the fourth game and so even the series. Perhaps the uncharacteristic tenacity he showed in this game, which led him to play one of the slowest moves of his career, had the effect of upsetting Takemiya's rhythm. The usually cheerful and resilient Takemiya couldn't help letting his chagrin show on losing this game.

Game Five

Takemiya's Record Slow Move

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played in Toi hot spring, Shizuoka prefecture, on 29, 30 June 1988.

Report by Aoki Masaru.





Figure 1 (1-45)

Black 45: 5 hours 7 minutes



Dia. 1: good for Black

Figure 1 (1-45). What was Takemiya thinking about?

This game attracted attention first, last and foremost for the extraordinary amount of time Takemiya spent thinking on Black 45.

What is the significance of this unprecedented period of thought? I think that the factor sparking it off is hidden in the fourth game. Otake spent an arduous two hours 33 minutes on the sealed move and managed to turn around an unfavourable game. For Otake, known for his rapid play, this was unusual. But perhaps it had the ironical effect of arousing Takemiya's fighting spirit. Takemiya must have felt Otake's forcefulness and tenacity. I can't believe that it's merely a coincidence that Takemiya thought almost exactly twice as long as Otake. Perhaps he was spurred on by a sense of crisis about his Honinbo defence.

The next question is what was he thinking of in all that time spent on 45. Before answering that, let's go back a bit. Instead of 38, playing the outside-turn version of the avalanche joseki with 1 in *Dia. 1* gives White a bad result up to 12

Instead of 45, turning at 1 in *Dia. 2* is also feasible, but the result to 12 is not appealing for


Takemiya's Marathon Move

When Takemiya started on his marathon thinking bout, the professionals following the game were at first surprised, next incredulous, then finally they were shaking their heads in mock disgust. As the commentary shows, Takemiya was thinking about follow-up attacks after 45, but he has long been known for his dislike of large-scale josekis, because they settle the shape and reduce the subtlety of the game (Otake shares this dislike), so inevitably jokes began to fly that he didn't know the joseki. After all, there are only two answers to White 44 and it doesn't take long to determine that 1 in *Dia. 2* is bad for Black.


After the game Takemiya affected surprise when told that 45 was a joseki move, but these post-game comments of the players are not always reliable. In any case, Takemiya did say that this was the last time he'd play the avalanche joseki.

One additional reason why Takemiya's slowness took people by surprise was that the opening of this game had been played at a faster pace (two hours five minutes for the first 44 moves) than the previous games. (See page 64 for a comparison of the playing speeds of Otake and Takemiya.)

Black. The black group at the top remains insecure, but even more painful is the fact that the black moyo at the bottom disappears.




Dia. 2: good for White



Dia. 3: White falls into a trap.

It was not these variations that Takemiya spent his time analysing. Rather, it was White's resistance with 2 in *Dia. 3*. However, Black has the carefully planned counterstrategy of 3 to 9. If White persists with 10, Black blocks at 11 and White is annihilated. Alternatively, instead of White 8 —



Dia. 4: Black is satisfied

Dia. 4. If White crawls at 1, Black 2 forces him to add a stone at 3; after 4 to 7, Black would expand his moyo with a move around A in Figure 1. Black would be happy with this.

These variations represent only the tip of the iceberg. It's probably also true, as Takemiya said self-mockingly after the game, that he didn't know 45 was the joseki. But that hardly means, as an amateur might imagine, that he spent the time trying to recall an existing joseki. Players of his calibre create the josekis. In this long spell of concentrated thought, Takemiya was like a poet writing a poem.




Figure 2 (46-76)

Figure 2 (46-76). Unthinking play by Otake

White 46. White could also have struck at the vital point of 51. This was the move Takemiya feared most; the variations are extremely difficult.

Record Slow Moves

With one move, Takemiya gave this game a place in go history: he far outstripped the previous record for the slowest move. Since the usual time limits are six hours per player, only those who compete in one of the top three title matches have a realistic chance of outdoing him. The standings are:

1. Five hours seven minutes: Takemiya.
2. Three hours 54 minutes: Kada Katsuji 9-dan, playing against Kobayashi Koichi in the 1976 Kisei tournament (this was a one-day game!).
3. Three hours three minutes: Rin Kaiho, playing against Sakata in Game Two of the 23rd Honinbo title (1968).
4. Three hours: Cho Chikun, playing against Takemiya in the 3rd game of the 9th Kisei title (1985) match (so Takemiya has also been on the receiving end). (See GW40.)
5. Two hours 57 minutes: Fujisawa Shuko, playing Kato in Game Five of the 2nd Kisei title (1977). Incidentally, Kato spent one hour 55 minutes on his reply. (See GW8.)

In a 1907 game without time limits, Honinbo Shusai spent eight hours on one move.

White plays 64 and 66 because he doesn't want Black to get a peep at A. However, letting Black build thickness with 67 is dubious.

The forcing move of 72 feels good. White 76 is unthinking. Considering the black moyo below, White naturally has to go as far as B. The difference of a line cannot be slighted.



Otake's ship founders on Takemiya's rock-solid concentration. The caption reads: 'Now the Otake aesthetic will come into play.' Actually Otake's play in this game, specifically the moves 64 and 66, was considered to fall short of his usual high standards. (Cartoon by Ayusawa Makoto.)




Figure 3 (77-100)

Figure 3 (77-100). *Takemiya takes charge.*

Black 77 is an ideal attack: it expands the black moyo while striking at the vital point of White's shape. White painstakingly settles his group with 78 etc., but simply jumping to A would also be a good strategy.

The game looks easy for Black when he succeeds in converting his moyo into territory with 85 and 87.

Black 95 is a very skilful move. It secures Black's base while aiming at the cut at B.




Figure 4 (101-123)

Figure 4 (101-123). *The losing move*

Black 9 is a safety-first move: Black is confident he's ahead. If he omits 9, White will exploit the aji of A by attaching at B. This would be hard to handle. (Takemiya went into byo-yomi on this

move.)

The invasion of 10 is the losing move. White lives on the side, eating away at Black's territory there, but Black takes ample compensation in the centre. Instead of 10, White should make a shoulder hit at 13, which would enable him to reduce the centre. When Black closes off the top of his moyo with 21 and 23, White is no longer in the contest. [According to *Go Weekly*, the author of this commentary, Aoki, an amateur, predicted White 10, only to have Okubo 9-dan and Abe 9-dan deny it was good. They were embarrassed when Otake immediately played there, but Otake agreed after the game that White 13 was correct.]




Figure 5 (124-161)

Figure 5 (124-161). *Takemiya takes the lead again.*

When White resigns, he is about ten points behind on the board.

White resigns after Black 161.

('Kido', September 1988)

Otake in bad form?

This game was played in Toi hot spring, the birthplace of Honinbo Shuwa (1820-73). The day before this game, the players visited his family home, which is still standing. A woman from the neighbourhood offered them some local tea, with the comment: 'If you drink this, your go is bound to improve.' Perhaps she didn't realize what a problem it would be for other go players if Otake and Takemiya got any stronger.

As far as this game was concerned, Takemiya didn't need any outside help.

The short amount of time Otake used in this game perhaps showed that he was unable to get fired up for it. In his speech at the reception the night before the game Takemiya had, when asked about his chances of winning, commented with his inimitable frankness that 'my opponent's been playing badly'. Only Takemiya could make a remark like this at a time when the series was tied 2-2, but he considered the fourth game a moral victory for him.

Otake's poor performance in the fifth game probably confirmed Takemiya in his opinion, but Otake soon showed that one reverse had not knocked him out of contention.

Game Six

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Otake Hideo

Played in Hachioji City, Tokyo, on 6, 7 July 1988.

Commentary by Otake.




Figure 1 (1-29)


Figure 1 (1-29). *I prefer a flexible position.*

Quite a stir was caused by the five hours seven minutes that Takemiya spent on one move in the fifth game. Once you start, there's no limit to the amount of time you can spend thinking in the stage when the game moves from the opening to the middle game, yet even so I was filled with admiration for his powers of concentration. Thinking like that requires stamina. Since I think along with the opponent, I found it most exhausting. I was even assailed by the fear that he might have read out the whole game...


People ask me what on earth he could have

been thinking about, but that's not something I can answer. Mental telepathy is effective to some degree [Otake is known for his ability to intuit what the opponent is going to play], but we're talking about five hours; it would have been interesting if his thoughts could all have been flashed up on a screen.


Instead of Black 9, you often see the pattern in *Dia. 1*, but this greedy strategy, attacking on top of taking territory, is not to my liking.



Dia. 1: greedy



Dia. 2: the pincer




Dia. 3: variation

Another alternative is the pincer in *Dia. 2*. After 1 to 5, White will either connect at 6 or play the variation in *Dia. 3*.


I played the flexible move of 9. Even though this lets White extend to 10, Black is left with the invasion point of 'a'. This is my style: putting pressure on the opponent by threatening, 'I'll invade! I'll invade!'

Black 13. Better to extend immediately to 15, the Kobayashi style (see GW53, page 35). If then White 22, Black can extend to 'b'.

White 24 is a difficult point, so I expected my opponent to take his time making up his mind, and sure enough he spent two hours 22 minutes on the move. Of course, he was thinking about 26 rather than the forcing move of 24. With his fondness for the centre, Takemiya would prefer not to have to make a move like 26; though it is the joseki, it helps Black to move into the centre with 27. A feasible alternative is White 1 in *Dia. 4* (next page), but presumably Takemiya lacked confidence in this centre strategy. There is a hole at 'a' and Black can also aim at cutting across the knight's move with 'b'.



Dia. 4: too risky?



*Figure 2 (30-61)
40: connects (at 31)*

Figure 2 (30-61). *But sometimes I'm too rigid.*

White 30. Takemiya commented that he should have played White 'a', Black 'b', White 32.


White 40, the sealed move, was Takemiya's second really slow move of the day (two hours 36 minutes). He was considering whether to start a ko with White 'c' or whether to follow *Dia. 5*, creating an absolute ko threat at 7 for the same ko fight after 5. However, Black also gets a reasonable ko threat at 10, giving him a satisfactory result with 12. (If next White 'a', then Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.) That's why Takemiya took his time, but I had a feeling that he wouldn't play the ko.

White 46. Isn't White 'd' the correct move? The threat of Black 'e'–White 'f'–Black 'g' after 46 makes White's position thin.

The tenuki of Black 51 is the kind of move that can lose you the game. When I was playing, the thought in my mind was that if Black answers at 1 in *Dia. 6*, he gets a bad result after White attaches at 2.


Another marathon effort by Takemiya

The way the players used their time allowance in this game was even stranger than in the fifth game. They set a bizarre record: the biggest gap between the time taken by two opponents in a day's play. Takemiya used seven hours 44 minutes to Otake's 27 minutes, an extraordinary contrast in speed. The slow play started with White 12, which took Takemiya one hours seven minutes. Even Kajiwara wouldn't take so long over a joseki move like this; the professionals following the game could only shake their heads in amazement. Takemiya then doubled that with two hours 22 minutes on White 24. Another prolonged effort on the sealed move meant that he used almost all of his time (nine hours) on the first day. And this from a player who's an advocate of shorter time limits!




Dia. 5: Black can handle the fight.

9: ko



Dia. 6: bad for Black



Dia. 7: feasible

It's certainly true that after Black 3 to 14 here, the counter of White 'a' stops Black from blocking at 'b': that's why White played the marked

stone. This diagram is a trap, so I can't play at 1 — this is the rigid, simplistic logic I applied here. There was something wrong with me. I should have explored the alternatives to Black 3; for example, settling the group with 2 to 10 in *Dia. 7* would be a good strategy. Anyway, I had to adopt a more flexible attitude.

The hane of 52 is, as might be expected, quite severe. As far as effectiveness goes, switching to 51 was like punching at thin air.






Figure 3 (62-100)



Dia. 8: disaster



Dia. 9: bad for White

Figure 3 (62-100). Black hallucinates — and White lets slip his chance.

Black has no choice about 63. If he answered 62 with 1 in *Dia. 8*, White would extend at 2; after 3 and 5, White 6 works perfectly, attacking both black groups.

When White blocked at 64, I thought that I was behind.

Black 65 was perhaps a move I should have played earlier, as White would probably have answered by connecting at 71. With that exchange on the board, Black could crawl at 66 and live easily.

Note that instead of 65, it would not be out of the question to seek life by playing at the

shoulder of the white stone with Black 'a', but Black would gain nothing by living in such cramped fashion.


White 70. Connecting at 1 in *Dia. 9* is an incredibly big move, but, as anyone can see, letting Black break through in the centre with 2 to 8 would be bad.

Incidentally, Takemiya went into byo-yomi on 68. [Otake, in contrast, had still only used 58 minutes by move 117.]


Black 75 is an awful move. I hallucinated that there was nothing Takemiya could do in the corner. Actually, it might be more honest to say that I thought I was behind and I let myself be swayed by my emotions.

If Black uses 75 to extend at 'b' or to defend the corner with 77, White can't do anything; according to calculations made by some young players, the game would then be close.

White 82. If White plays 1 to 5 in *Dia. 10*, his attack in the corner succeeds. The game would be over. If Black descends at 6, he collapses after White 7 to 13. Consequently, instead of 6 —



Dia. 10: White's chance to finish the game



Dia. 11: White should win.

ko: 7, 10, 13, 18

Dia. 11. Black has no choice but to atari at 2, which lets White get a ko. In exchange for the ko, White would live on the bottom right. This looks like a win for White. But —

Making the exchange of 82 for 83 eliminates this possibility. Black is now able to drop back to 89 (if at 90, Black hanes at 91 and gets a ko).

The first thing Takemiya said to me after the game was: 'If I'd played here [1 to 5 in *Dia. 10*], it would've been all over,' so it's not as if he made a mistake in reading. He still had a little bit of time (four minutes), so it's hard to fathom why he didn't play that sequence if he knew about it.

Probably the only explanation is that my playing the terrible move of 75 threw him off balance.

White 94. If White blocked Black's path with 'c', it would still be a difficult game. Letting 75 be swallowed up would be bad, so Black would probably escape with 'd', but then complications could be expected, with White seeking a double attack on the groups above and below. Takemiya doubtless lost his temper with 94 because he was upset by his failure at the bottom.




Figure 4 (101-131)
25: connects

Figure 4 (101-131. *Black suddenly takes a big lead.*

Living on the left side up to 5 is extremely big; the reduction to White's territory alone is worth 40 points. If Black cuts at 'a', White will have to seek life for his large group, so he won't have time to save the three stones.

White 6. If White 11, White will probably be able to capture the black group above, but since Black is looking for a chance to sacrifice it, the smaller-scale move would only make him all the more ready to do so.

After Black 9 and 11, Black is in a position to sell his life dearly.

For White to attempt to capture Black with 20 is only natural. If instead White pulls back at 21, he won't be able to catch Black after Black 'b'.

White captures the group with 26, but Black is able to cut at 31; that enables him to squeeze on the outside and puts him way ahead.

White plays on a bit, just to see what happens, but the game has already been decided.




Figure 5 (132-163)

Figure 5 (132-163). *The match goes the full distance.*

The match has been a very painful one for me, but at least I've made it go the full distance. Before the match began, I said to a reporter, 'I want to play the kind of go that will force Takemiya to use 120% of his power,' but my play has completely failed to live up to my words. It's been a wretched experience, with my stones going in the opposite direction of the one I was thinking of and with many obvious mistakes. Perhaps Takemiya Honinbo has been playing so slowly, because, with such a worthless opponent, he has had to make special efforts to exert 120% of his strength. In contrast to his formidable powers of concentration, I find myself suffering from terrible fatigue around 4 and 5 o'clock, just before the end of play on the first day, and I am unable to organize my thoughts.

It's been a very arduous match, but now that we're down to the last game, I have the feeling I'll be able to approach the final game in a more relaxed frame of mind.

('Kido', September 1988)

Game Seven

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played at the Tokyo Bay Hilton International hotel, in Urayasu City, Chiba prefecture, on 20, 21 July 1988.

This commentary is an abridged version of a commentary dictated by Takemiya.





Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *Inhibited play?*


As this was the deciding game, I couldn't help but play a safe and solid game. There's not enough freedom or originality in my play. To start with, since White ignored my move at 8, I should have ignored his move at 9 and made another move in the top left; this would be the proper spirit. Instead I went along with him with 9; it's not that I dislike this move itself, it's just that it has a passive feel. Pressing at 'a' with 9 would have been more manly; if White 27, Black presses again at 'b'. This way the stone at 6 would be dead; in contrast, all the black stones would be full of life.

If this fuseki comes up again, I'll play like this without fail. Because this was the all-important last game, I played the safe move. Black 17 is another cautious move. Playing prudently and solidly might work for another player, but in my case it is sometimes bad, as it impedes the free flow of my imagination. I did consider Black 1 in *Dia. 1* . . . If the sequence here follows, the result is ideal. However, expecting such an ideal development would be self-indulgent. Moreover, my opponent was Otake. If White switches to 4 and 6 in *Dia. 2*, the 1-2 exchange becomes very slack.

White 20. White could also block at 21, emphasizing the left side, but Otake chose to focus on his wide position at the top. I was satisfied because my jump to 27 made the location of 6 painful for White. It now falls between two stools [neither building a side position nor securing the bottom left corner].



Dia. 1: perfect for Black




Dia. 2: White's counter

Black 29. Any Takemiya fan would have seen this move coming. You could call it a resolute move, taking the measure of both moyos. This is definitely not the kind of position in which Black will want to invade at 'c'. Rather, Black will want to let White surround the top and in return expand the centre.

White 36 is a good point for reducing the moyo. If Black answers at 'd' and White next lays waste to his side by invading at 'e', then 'd' will be turned into a submissive move. If instead Black caps at 'f', White will jump down to 'g' and have no worries.

The answer is to forget about the centre for the time being.

I think that 48 was funny. Even though it's gote, I think that White should build thickness with 1 to 7 in *Dia. 3*. [Fujisawa Shuko called 48 the losing move; he also advocated attaching at 1, a move which he said Imamura Toshiya 8-dan of the Kansai Ki-in had suggested to him.]



Dia. 3: building thickness





Figure 2 (51-75)



Dia. 4: more like the Takemiya style

Figure 2 (51-75). Why did I give White good shape?

Black 53 is good shape in this area. If White answers at 57, Black continues with a two-step hane; if instead White 'a', Black can aim at 'b'. Therefore, White has no good answer here.

Still, White 54 makes fantastic shape, in sente. I was well aware of this, so why did I give White such a good move? I yielded to the allure of the temptress 53. Wake up to yourself! I should have attacked immediately with 1 in *Dia. 4*. A frontal breakthrough with 2 and 4 would be unreasonable for White. White would probably try to settle himself by attaching at 'a'. Black could just let him live small on the side. If I then proceed by attacking at Black 'b', waiting for a chance to play Black 'c', my lead would be beyond doubt. This would be more like my kind of game.

Belatedly I attacked at 59, but I was one tempo behind.

[Black 67 was the sealed move.]

When White played 70 and 72, the game was even. I was feeling desperate when I attacked at 75.





Figure 3 (76-100)



Dia. 5: promising for White

Figure 3 (76-100). The issue is decided in a flash.

Black has helped White to make the centre really thick. If you look at the original position, you can see that Black has achieved nothing there. However —

From Otake's point of view, he must have been quite pleased with the unexpected favourable turn in the game. But just when things started to seem brighter, there was a pitfall lurking.

White 78 and 80 are big, because they take away Black's base, but White is too concerned

with details. If instead he had followed *Dia. 5*, it would not have been easy for Black to win. This way White will get territory in the centre. I had hope again when I was able to play 81.

White A next would be the safe move, but Black should be able to take the lead if he blocks at B. So, for better or for worse, White stakes the game on 82.

However, starting with the blow at the vital point of 83, I was able to go on the offensive immediately. So far I had been following a perhaps excessively cautious policy, but now I was able to play boldly. From this point on I felt no spiritual misgivings or uneasiness. And the game did become one-sided. White had three weak groups: the pressure on him was too much to bear.

There is no need for a detailed commentary on the rest of the game, so I will just look at a couple of points.






Figure 4 (101-125)



Dia. 6: if White attacks *Dia. 7: safety-first*
Figure 4 (101-125). A win however Black plays it.

After White 2, it looks as if White can kill

Black with the sequence in *Dia. 6*, but in practice Black will be able to play 9 in sente, so White will have to play a ko with White 8-Black 9.

With 4, White would rather die than secure an eye in the centre by playing at 9.

Black 13. Black A is also possible or Black could follow the safety-first course of *Dia. 7*.

After White 14, Black gets an excellent squeeze at the bottom.




Figure 5 (126-157)

31: throw-in; 32: takes; 34: connects




Figure 6 (158-189)

89: ko (at 79)

Figure 5 (126-157), Figure 6 (158-189). How to play my own game?

Looking back on this series, I am satisfied because on the whole my fuseki was good. Not once did I fall behind Otake in the opening. On the other hand, letting slip good games because of

blunders is unacceptable. This is something I have to think about.

You can't afford to lose a challenge match, so there's a tendency to play cautiously. When you do this, especially in my case, the good side of your game is lost. This final game is a good example. I have to try to arrange things so that I can play my free, spontaneous game and still get a good result.

I would like to thank all my fans for their support. I have now won six Honinbo titles in all, so

The Long and the Short of It: How the Players Used Their Time

On a number of occasions in recent years Takemiya has gone on the record as advocating a reduction in time allowances for tournament games. He has pointed to the example of China, which allots a uniform three hours per player for all games, whereas in Japan the time varies from five hours per player to nine hours in two-day games.

His extraordinarily slow play in this title match therefore came as a bit of a surprise though of course there's no reason why he shouldn't use all the time made available to him: he didn't make the rules for the tournament. Still, it's interesting to note that his play got slower and slower as the match progressed, while Otake, a fast player to begin with, tended to speed up.

Below is a list of the total time taken for each game by the two players, with the time for the first day given in parentheses.

- Game 1. Otake: 5 hours 53 minutes (3:54)
Takemiya: 7:21 (3:14)
- Game 2. Otake: 5:12 (2:27)
Takemiya: 8:53 (5:33)
- Game 3. Otake: 5:36 (3:18)
Takemiya: 8:53 (4:42)
- Game 4. Otake: 6:29 (4:13)
Takemiya: 8:59 (4:38)
- Game 5. Otake: 3:16 (1:15)
Takemiya: 8:59 (5:57)
- Game 6. Otake: 1:18 (0:27)
Takemiya: 8:59 (7:44)
- Game 7. Otake: 4:42 (1:21)
Takemiya: 8:59 (6:37)

I'm not far behind Takagawa's nine and Sakata's seven. This tournament suits me down to the ground; if you say Honinbo, you think of Takemiya. There's no else around anymore who matches the title. The other players will have to try harder if they want to stop me from monopolizing it.

Next year too, of course, I will defend the title.

White resigns after Black 189.

Honinbo Title Winners

- 1st Honinbo (1941): Sekiyama Riichi 6-dan
- 2nd (1943): Hashimoto Utau 7-dan (won 1-0)
- 3rd (1945): Iwamoto Kaoru 7-dan (won 3-3, then 2-0)
- 4th (1947): Iwamoto (defeated Kitani 3-2)
- 5th (1950): Hashimoto Utau 8-dan (won 4-0)
- 6th (1951): Hashimoto (defeated Sakata 4-3)
- 7th (1952): Takagawa Kaku 7-dan (won 4-1)
- 8th (1953): Takagawa (defeated Kitani 4-2)
- 9th (1954): Takagawa (defeated Sugiuchi 4-2)
- 10th (1955): Takagawa (defeated Shimamura 4-0)
- 11th (1956): Takagawa (defeated Shimamura 4-2)
- 12th (1957): Takagawa (defeated Fujisawa Hosai 4-2)
- 13th (1958): Takagawa (defeated Sugiuchi 4-2)
- 14th (1959): Takagawa (defeated Kitani 4-2)
- 15th (1960): Takagawa (defeated Fujisawa Shuko 4-2)
- 16th (1961): Sakata Eio 9-dan (won 4-1)
- 17th (1962): Sakata (defeated Handa Dogen 4-1)
- 18th (1963): Sakata (defeated Takagawa 4-2)
- 19th (1964): Sakata (defeated Takagawa 4-0)
- 20th (1965): Sakata (defeated Yamabe 4-0)
- 21st (1966): Sakata (defeated Fujisawa Shuko 4-0)
- 22nd (1967): Sakata (defeated Rin Kaiho 4-1)
- 23rd (1968): Rin Kaiho 9-dan (won 4-3)
- 24th (1969): Rin (defeated Kato 4-2)
- 25th (1970): Rin (defeated Sakata 4-0)
- 26th (1971): Ishida Yoshio 7-dan (won 4-2)
- 27th (1972): Ishida (defeated Rin 4-3)
- 28th (1973): Ishida (defeated Rin 4-0)
- 29th (1974): Ishida (defeated Takemiya 4-3)
- 30th (1975): Ishida (defeated Sakata 4-3)
- 31st (1976): Takemiya Masaki 8-dan (won 4-1)
- 32nd (1977): Kato Masao 8-dan (won 4-1)
- 33rd (1978): Kato (defeated Ishida 4-3)
- 34th (1979): Kato (defeated Rin 4-1)
- 35th (1980): Takemiya (defeated Kato 4-1)
- 36th (1981): Cho Chikun (defeated Takemiya 4-2)
- 37th (1982): Cho (defeated Kobayashi Koichi 4-2)
- 38th (1983): Rin (defeated Cho 4-3)
- 39th (1984): Rin (defeated Awaji 4-1)
- 40th (1985): Takemiya (defeated Rin 4-1)
- 41st (1986): Takemiya (defeated Yamashiro 4-1)
- 42nd (1987): Takemiya (defeated Yamashiro 4-0)
- 43rd (1988): Takemiya (defeated Otake 4-3)

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
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Part Two gives three game commentaries, including the strangest game the author has ever played, “the ladder mimic game”.

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